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We study the characteristics and abilities of CEO candidates for companies involved in buyout (LBO)
and venture capital (VC) transactions and relate them to hiring decisions, investment decisions, and
company performance.  Candidates are assessed on more than thirty individual abilities. The abilities
are highly correlated; a factor analysis suggests there are two primary factors with intuitive characterizations
– one for general ability and one that contrasts team-related, interpersonal skills with execution skills.
 Both LBO and VC firms are more likely to hire and invest in CEOs with greater general abilities,
both execution- and team-related.  Success, however, is more strongly related to execution skills than
to team-related skills.  Success is, at best, only marginally related to incumbency, holding observable
talent and ability constant.
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Given their leadership positions and compensation, CEOs likely have a significant impact on the 
their companies’ success.  And, of course, there is a great deal of anecdotal evidence about what CEOs do 
and how they matter, particularly in the popular press.  Surprisingly, economic theorists provide little 
guidance, and there is very little systematic, large sample, empirical work in the economics, finance and 
management literatures on how and why CEOs matter. 
There are many economic theories that model CEOs or agents running firms.  Some theorists, like 
Holmstrom (1979) treat all agents or CEOs as being the same and focus on effort provision.  In these 
theories, however, the individual CEO does not matter.  Some theorists do model CEOs with different 
talents and abilities, and assume those abilities map into firm performance.  For example, Rosen (1981) 
models talent or ability with an index, q.  The talent distribution is assumed fixed and costlessly 
observable.  Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) assume that CEOs have ability, ai.   And Gabaix and Landier 
(2007) assume that managers and CEOs have talent, T(m).  While these theorists assume CEOs have 
different ability or talent, and assume the ability is observable, they provide no guidance whatsoever 
concerning what those abilities or talents are.  
A recent exception is a paper by Bolton et al. (2008) who model CEOs as trading off the ability to 
coordinate employees’ actions with the ability to react to new information.  CEOs vary in being more or 
less resolute which the authors define as a type of overconfidence.  In their model, more resolute CEOs 
are more successful because the increased coordination benefits from being resolute outweigh the costs of 
not fully reacting to new information.  Also, see Van den Steen (2005) for a closely related paper. 
 Similarly to the theoretical literature, empirical work in economics and finance suggests that 
CEOs matter, but that work is just beginning to consider what particular abilities or skills are important.  
For example, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) study managers who move from one firm to another, and find 
evidence consistent with different managers having different styles, different behavior, and different 
performance.  Bloom and Van Reenen (2006) use survey data to find that different management practices   2
are related to firm performance.  Bennedsen et al. (2007) find that firm performance is negatively related 
to CEO focus.  These papers are silent, however, on what defines the different styles and characteristics. 
More recently, several papers have begun to consider what characteristics might be important.  
Schoar (2008) finds that CEO actions are related to whether they join the labor market in a downturn or a 
boom.  Graham and Narasimhan (2004) find specific effects on leverage for managers going through the 
great depression.  One might interpret both papers as using measures of conservatism.  Malmendier and 
Tate (2004, 2007), Ben-David et al. (2007) and Graham et al. (2008) find that CEO decisions and 
outcomes are related to measures of CEO overconfidence, optimism and risk aversion. 
The empirical management literature, like the most of the economics and finance literature, 
focuses on directly observable characteristics, such as CEOs’ “education,” “functional background,” and 
“age.” Hambrick and Mason (1984) stress that these observable characteristics are, at best, proxies for 
underlying psychological factors, but they also recognize the difficulties of gathering data with these 
underlying factors for CEOs.   
This paper adds to the empirical literature by providing new evidence on CEO characteristics and 
abilities, and their relation to hiring, investment decisions, and firm performance.  We rely on detailed 
assessments of 316 CEO candidates for positions in firms funded by private equity (PE) investors – both 
buyout (LBO) and venture capital (VC) investors.  The assessments are based on four-hour structured 
interviews performed from 2000 to 2006 by ghSmart, a firm that assesses CEO candidates. The data 
include quantitative and qualitative information about the candidate’s education and employment history 
as well as assessments of a wide range of personal skills and attributes.  We complement the assessment 
data with data on hiring, investment and success from the PE firms and from public sources. 
With these data, we make three contributions.  First, we extend the set of measured CEO 
characteristics and abilities.  
Second, existing empirical work is primarily concerned with the relation between CEO identity 
(i.e., fixed effects) and investment policy, financial policy, and performance (see Bertrand, Schoar, 2003 
and Bennedsen et al., 2007).  This paper takes a first step towards understanding why a particular CEO   3
might have those effects by studying the relation of particular CEO candidate characteristics and abilities 
to CEO hiring decisions, to investor investment decisions, and, conditional on hiring, to firm 
performance.  The data also allow us to consider whether different abilities matter for different companies 
or investments (i.e., companies funded by VC versus LBO firms). 
Finally, we consider the related question of the importance of firm-specific knowledge or ability 
versus general ability by comparing inside and outside CEO candidates.  Several theories about the trade-
off between firm-specific ability and general ability predict that outside candidates have higher abilities, 
on average, but there is very limited evidence about whether this is true in practice, nor is there any 
evidence on the particular dimensions where this trade-off is more relevant (see Frydman (2006) and 
Murphy and Zabonjik (2004)).  In the management literature, Khurana (2002) takes the opposite side and 
argues that firms should shy away from outsiders, particularly charismatic outsiders.  
In this paper, we focus on the 30 specific characteristics or abilities that ghSMART assessed for 
the candidates in our sample.  Because many of the individual characteristics are correlated, we also use a 
factor analysis to extract the main patterns of variation in the characteristics.  We find two factors that are 
particularly important and have intuitive interpretations:  the first loads positively on all abilities and, 
thus, appears to measure overall talent; the other loads positively on team-related abilities (“teamwork,” 
“listening skills,” “open to criticism,” and “treats people with respect”), and negatively on execution-
related capabilities (“aggressive,” “fast mover,” “persistent,” and “proactive”).  We also separate the 
second factor into its team-related and execution-related components to investigate the absolute effects of 
these types of abilities rather than their relative effects that are picked up in the initial factor analysis.  
Ratings for outsider CEOs are generally higher than ratings for incumbent CEOs although the 
differences are largely driven by candidates from LBO-funded firms. This is consistent with investors and 
firms trading off general skills and ability against firm-specific skills and knowledge. 
We then consider determinants of hiring and investment decisions.  PE firms – both LBO and VC 
firms – are more likely to hire and invest in more highly rated / talented CEOs, particularly for outsider 
hires.  We also find that insider CEOs are significantly more likely to remain in their positions or be   4
hired, holding their skill constant.  Firms appear to trade off general or observable abilities against firm-
specific skills and knowledge. 
Next, we consider the relation between a CEO’s ratings and subsequent success.  We measure 
success using evaluations from the PE firms (when we can obtain them) and our own assessments of 
success from publicly available data.   
For LBO firms, success is significantly positively related to a number of individual abilities.  
They tend to be the execution-related measures (“efficient,” “organized,” “detailed,” “follows through,” 
“persistent,” “proactive,” “sets high standards,” and “holds people accountable”), rather than the 
interpersonal, team-related ones.  Consistent with this, we find that success is significantly positively 
related to the general talent factor and to the execution-related factor in regressions that include the 
separated factors.  We find no relation between incumbency and success controlling for ability. 
For VCs, success is negatively (not positively) related to some of the individual measures of 
talent, including execution-, neutral and team-related measures.  The relations become positive (although 
not significant) when we control for time, likely reflecting the fact that many of the VC-funded 
companies in the sample were funded during the tech boom in the late 1990s and early 2000s when many 
of those businesses were not viable.  When we move to a regression framework, we find a significantly 
negative relation between success and the team-related factor and a positive (but not significant) relation 
between success and the execution-related factor.  We find mixed evidence for a positive relation between 
incumbency and success (controlling for ability). 
Together, the results for LBOs and VCs suggest that execution-related abilities are positively 
related to success while team-related abilities are negatively related to success.  Holding ability constant, 
incumbency is only marginally related to success. 
Finally, we explore whether the success results are sensitive to observables or to sample selection 
issues.  We do not find that the results are sensitive to the inclusion of observables like age, education, 
and industry.  We also attempt to address the problem of endogenous matching of candidates and 
companies that arises when unobservable characteristics affect which candidates particular firms hire.    5
While we cannot completely reject a sample selection bias, we report two analyses that are not consistent 
with one.  We find no systematic correlation between outcomes and the qualities of candidates who are 
not hired for a particular job.  If selection were a problem, we would expect candidates who are not hired 
as the CEO of a particular company to have similar characteristics to the hired candidates.  We also 
consider a Heckman selection model in which the first stage is the hiring decision and the second stage is 
the performance relation.  We include the insider dummy or an overall recommendation in the hiring 
decision, but exclude it in the performance regressions.  We obtain similar results to our basic 
specifications. 
Overall, we believe the analysis and results are novel and suggestive.  The results on success are 
generally consistent with the predictions of Bolton et al. that “resolute” CEOs are more successful than 
“good listeners.” 
The results also are related to studies of the five factor model (of personality) in the psychology 
literature.  According to the model, personalities consist of five factors:  extraversion, emotional stability, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experience.  Studies that relate personality to 
performance tend to find conscientiousness has the most explanatory power.  This is consistent with our 
findings that execution-related skills of CEOs are related to performance.  To our knowledge, there are no 
such personality studies for individuals at the CEO level.  See Barrick, Mount and Judge (2001) for a 
summary of this literature (and Morgeson et al. (2007) for a skeptical view). 
This research is also closely related to Collins (2001) who studies a sample of eleven CEOs of 
companies with outstanding performance.  He identifies them as “Level 5” leaders who build “enduring 
greatness” and share the traits of:  compelling modesty; giving credit to others and taking blame on 
themselves; showing unwavering resolve and workmanlike diligence; and building strong teams.  The 
primary concerns with his study are the small sample size and the potential for ex-post selection bias, 
because he chooses his sample of CEOs based on superior past performance.  Our analysis uses a larger 
sample of CEO candidates chosen ex-ante.  Our results for LBO CEOs are consistent with important roles   6
for unwavering resolve and workmanlike diligence.  They are not consistent, however, with important 
roles for the other traits Collins identifies.  
Interestingly, our results, particularly those for buyout CEOs, seem most consistent with those 
described in Drucker (1967).  According to Drucker, effective executives “differ widely in their 
personalities, strengths, weaknesses, values and beliefs.  All they have in common is they get the right 
things done.”  To get things done, effective executives:  “utilize time efficiently”; “focus on 
contribution”; “make strengths productive”; “do first things first”; and “make effective decisions.”  These 
appear to be the execution-related skills we find are most correlated with success.  
We add one last caveat to interpreting the results. The people we study are CEOs of buyout and 
VC-funded companies that may have special needs.  As a result, it is not possible to know whether the 
results generalize to CEOs of other firms, particularly public companies.  However, we believe the 
similarity of our results to those of Drucker (1967) is suggestive in that Drucker’s work was based on 
personal observations of many executives in many different types of firms. 
 
II. Data 
 A.  Assessments 
We rely on detailed assessments of 316 CEO candidates for positions in firms funded by private 
equity (PE) investors, consisting of both VC and LBO investors.  The assessments are performed from 
2000 to 2006 by ghSMART, a firm that specializes in assessing top management candidates.  The 
assessments are requested by the PE investors, typically at the time the PE firm is considering an 
investment or considering hiring a new CEO.  
The assessments are typically 20 to 40 page documents that include detailed information on the 
candidates’ life, from childhood through current job experiences. They are based on structured interviews 
with the candidates that are of roughly four hours in duration and are performed by professional 
interviewers.  The data include quantitative and qualitative information about the managers’ education 
and employment histories as well as assessments of a wide range of personal skills and characteristics.   7
The typical assessment classifies the CEO candidate on 30 dimensions in five general areas:  
“leadership,” “personal,” “intellectual,” “motivational,” and “interpersonal.”  Table 1 presents 
ghSMART’s descriptions as well as guides for high and low scores for the assessed characteristics.  The 
characteristics are organized in the general areas used by ghSMART.   
The candidates are also typically assessed on abilities specific to the particular deal.  Because 
these abilities are not consistent across candidates, we do not include them in our analyses.  The results 
are qualitatively similar when we include them although the number of observations is reduced. 
In the discussion, we informally refer to characteristics as interpersonal / team-related, neutral, 
and execution-related.  Based largely on the factor analysis we describe below, we refer to “Develops 
People,” “Treats People with Respect,” “Calm,” “Flexibility,” “Listening,” “Open to Criticism,” and 
“Teamwork” as interpersonal or team-related skills.  We view “Removes Underperformers,” 
“Efficiency,” “Aggressive,” “Moves Fast,” “Persistence,” “Sets High Standards,” “Proactive,” “Work 
Ethic,” “Holds People Accountable” as execution-related skills.  We classify “Network,” “Hires A 
Players,” “Follows through on Commitments,” “Organization,” “Brainpower,” “Analytical,” “Strategic,” 
“Creative,” “Attention to Details,” “Integrity,” “Enthusiasm,” “Writing,” “Oral Communication,” and 
“Persuasion” as neutral or mixed.   
For each of the characteristics ghSMART assigns a letter grade to the CEO candidate, ranging 
from D (lowest) to A+ (highest).  We rescale these grades into four categories.  We classify grades of B 
or below as 1.  ghSMART reports that such grades are quite negative.  We combine these grades because 
there are relatively few below B.  We classify grades of A and A+ as 4.  ghSMART reports that such 
grades are very positive.  We combine them because there are relatively few A+’s.  We classify grades of 
B+ as 2 and grades of A- as 3.  We obtain qualitatively similar results when we do not combine grades. 
ghSMART structures the interviews in a systematic way to generate as much consistency as 
possible across interviews.  All interviews follow the same specified structure, and are conducted by 
trained, professional interviewers.  The interviewers generally either hold doctoral degrees or have 
degrees from top MBA programs and have worked at strategy consulting firms (such as McKinsey & Co.,   8
Bain, and Boston Consulting Group).  According to ghSMART, internal testing has found a high degree 
of consistency across assessments performed by different interviewers.  Our results are qualitatively 
identical when we use interviewer fixed effects in some of our analyses (not reported).   
When asked whether it is possible for executives to “game” the interview by providing answers 
that the candidates believes are “right,” ghSMART provided two main reasons why this is difficult.  First, 
VC and LBO investors almost always conduct detailed reference checks on the CEO candidates of their 
portfolio companies to verify the information in the assessments.  A candidate who gives misleading 
answers in the assessments risks exposure through comparison with the information from the reference 
checks.  Candidates are aware that reference checks are conducted, and this provides some motivation to 
be truthful.  Second, ghSMART has found that it is difficult to “game” the questions consistently in the 
course of a four-hour interview with an experienced interviewer. 
Personality assessments have been used and studied in the management psychology literature.  
That literature finds that the assessments generally provide reliable information.  For example, industrial 
organization psychologists find that self-reported questionnaires are robust to gaming and are 
substantially consistent (John and Srivastava, 1999).  And external assessments (by supervisors, co-
workers and customers) are typically found to be more reliable than self-assessments (Mount, Barrick and 
Strauss, 1994).   We believe that four-hour interviews by professional interviewers are likely to be at least 
as informative as the self-reported questionnaires and external assessments in those psychology studies. 
There are two other reasons we believe that these assessments are informative.  First (and 
anecdotally), at least two PE firms told us they do not make an investment without a CEO assessment of 
the type ghSMART provides.  Second, the assessments are costly for the PE firms.  They require at least 
four hours of a CEO’s time and a payment to ghSMART. 
While we believe the assessments are informative, it is worth stressing that if the assessments are 
subject to gaming, this would make the assessments noisy and create a bias against finding any relation of 
characteristics to outcomes.  In fact, characteristics are systematically related to outcomes in ways that are 
difficult to reconcile with gaming.  We discuss this in more detail below.   9
We also record track information in the assessments in addition to ratings.  When provided, we 
record observables about the CEO including age, college and graduate degrees, industry, and test scores. 
We note if the candidate is the incumbent CEO or is an outsider.  In a few cases, the candidate works for 
the company but not as CEO.  We include these candidates with outsiders.  Our results are identical if we 
include these candidates as incumbents.  We note if the PE firm has already invested in the company at 
the time of the assessment.  We collect information on the PE firms, particularly assets under 
management (a measure of size and prominence) at the time of the assessment.  Because young 
companies may require executives with different skills than more mature companies, we distinguish 
between assessments made by VC and by buyout investors.   
 
B.  Corporate Decisions and Performance 
In addition to information about the candidates, we coded three outcome measures, whether:  (1) 
the CEO candidate is hired; (2) the PE firm invests in the firm; and (3) the CEO who is hired succeeds. 
We collected this post-assessment information in two ways.  First, either ghSMART or we approached 
the PE firms.  We asked each PE firm whether it invested; if the firm invested, whether the candidate was 
hired; and if the PE firm invested and one of the candidates was hired, whether the CEO was successful.  
We also asked if the investment itself had been successful or unsuccessful, as well as for any available 
quantitative success measures.  We obtained responses from PE firms for 146 of the 316 CEO candidates 
in our sample.  
We complemented the PE firms’ information by using public sources to assess whether the 
investment was made, the CEO was hired, and the hired CEO was successful.  These sources included 
CapitalIQ, Zoominfo.com, VentureOne, Lexis-Nexis, company websites and the PE firms’ websites.   
Using the public sources, we created two additional measures of success.  The first we call the 
public measure and the second we call the broad public measure.  For both measures, we used PE firm 
responses if they were available.  For the first measure, we studied the hired CEOs for whom we did not 
get PE firm responses.  We classified a CEO as successful, if the CEO led the company or another   10
company to a clearly favorable exit such as an IPO or sale to another company.  We classified the CEO as 
unsuccessful if the company went bankrupt, the company was sold to another firm under distress or at a 
substantial loss, or the CEO was removed as CEO before any exit occurred.  In a few cases, we classified 
the CEO as having mixed success.  For example, we did this if the investors exited, but earned only a 
modest return.  
For the broad public measure, we began with the first public measure.  We then classified 
additional CEOs as successful if the company received positive press regarding its operations or received 
additional financing at higher valuations.  Similarly, we classified CEOs as unsuccessful, if the company 
had unfavorable press regarding its operations or subsequent financing.  We also classified the CEO as 
mixed if the company that the CEO ran had not exited in any form (IPO, sale, liquidation, etc.) and the 
company had not received any informative press. 
While we recognize that the two public success measures are somewhat coarse, they are similar to 
(and perhaps less coarse than) the success measures of IPO or IPO and sale used in many studies of 
venture capital.  (E.g., see Gompers et al. (2006) or Hochberg et al. (2007).)  When we compare the three 
measures of success, we view the PE measure as the most precise and the broad public measure as the 
least precise.  While the results are generally consistent using all three measures, the explanatory power of 
the regressions declines as we move from the most precise to least precise measure. 
 
C.  Summary sample descriptive statistics. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample.  Panel A presents information on 
incumbency and hiring, and the relation of the two.  In our sample of 316 candidates, 224 are hired.  
There is a large difference in hiring rates for incumbents and outsiders.  Of 171 incumbents, 159 (or 93%) 
are hired; of 145 outsiders, only 65 (or 45%) are hired.  The reason for this discrepancy is that in many 
cases, the CEO candidate was a founder and was extremely likely to remain with the company whether or 
not the PE firm invested.   11
Panel B presents information on hiring, PE firm investment, LBO and VC representation, 
incumbency, and the relation of those three variables.  Of the 316 candidates, 148 are assessed for LBO 
firms and 168 are assessed for VC firms, a roughly equal representation. 
Panel C presents information by firm.  The 316 CEO candidates are assessed for 258 different 
companies.  The PE firms invested in 181 of these 258 firms.  The panel shows that the PE firms tended 
to assess fewer outsiders in the firms in which they eventually did not invest.  It also shows that a larger  
fraction of incumbents remained CEO in firms in which the PE investors did not invest. Again, this is 
consistent with the incumbents in a number of firms being founders and wishing to remain as CEOs. 
Panels D and E summarize our success variables for the 224 CEO candidates who are hired.  The 
PE firms provided performance assessments for 81.  Of these, 37 (46%) were considered successful; (30) 
37%, not successful; and 14 (17%), either of mixed or uncertain success.  Using the first, more certain 
public measure, we can rate 126 candidates and estimate that 54 (43%) are successful, 67 (53%) are 
unsuccessful, and 5 (4%) are mixed.  Finally, using the broad public measure, we can rate 208 candidates 
and estimate that 92 (44%) are successful, 84 (40%) are unsuccessful, and 32 (16%) are mixed. 
Panel F describes the number of CEO candidates assessed per company.  Only one candidate was 
assessed in 219 of 258 companies; multiple candidates were assessed in the other 39 firms. 
 
III. Distribution and Aggregation of Managerial Characteristics 
Panel A of table 3 presents the average ratings of the characteristics for all 316 CEO candidates.  
Panel A indicates that there is a fair amount of variation in the ratings of the different CEO candidates.  
The standard deviations for most of the characteristics exceed 1 suggesting a wide spread in 
measurements for those characteristics.  Interestingly, the variables with the highest means and lowest 
standard deviations are “work ethic” and “integrity,” suggesting most individuals who reach the CEO 
candidate phase are perceived to have high integrity and a strong work ethic.   
Panel B presents the average ratings separately for LBO and VC candidates and for incumbents 
and outsiders. The LBO candidates are rated more highly than the VC candidates on 20 of 30   12
characteristics, significantly so on seven.  Those seven are a mix of team-related, interpersonal, and 
neutral skills –  “Attention to Details,” “Open to Criticism,” “Respect,” “Listening Skills,” and 
“Persistence,” “Flexibility,” and “Follow Through on Commitments.” The VC candidates are rated more 
highly on only two characteristics at the 10% level – “brainpower” and “strategic vision”.  
Because of the large number of included characteristics, one should be cautious in interpreting a 
few of those as being statistically significant.  Even if the data were random, some characteristics would 
be significant by chance.   Nevertheless, the patterns are suggestive.  Buyout CEOs score higher on 
characteristics related to a broader range of managerial and executive functions while VC CEOs appear to 
score higher only on characteristics related to intelligence and vision.  To the extent that entrepreneurs are 
over represented relative to professional managers in the VC-funded firms, these results suggest that 
entrepreneurs require less general management ability, but more knowledge-related skills than the 
professional managers. 
The second half of panel B of table 3 compares insider and outsider CEO candidates.  There are 
large ratings differences.  Outside candidates score higher than insiders on 19 of 30 characteristics.  In 8 
cases –  “hires A players,” “develops people,” “efficiency,” “network,” “organization,” “analytical skills,” 
“oral communication,” and “holds people accountable” – the differences are significant.  In only one case, 
“creativity,” do insiders outscore outsiders at the 10% significance level.   
Panel C compares insiders and outsiders for LBO and VC firms separately.  This panel shows that 
the outsider / insider differences are strongly driven by the LBO candidates.  Outsider LBO candidates 
outscore insiders in 21 of 30 abilities, significantly so in 7.  Insiders outscore outsiders at the 10% level 
on only one ability.  For VC candidates, outsiders and insiders are rated more highly on 15 characteristics 
each.  Insiders’ scores are significantly higher on brainpower and creativity while outsiders’ are 
significantly higher on the management-related skills of “efficiency” and “hiring A players.”  
These results, particularly those for the LBO candidates, are consistent with a number of 
explanations.  First, it is possible, that outside candidates are considered when internal candidates are not 
performing well.  Second, the results support the view that an important function of PE firms is to   13
upgrade the managerial talent in the firms in which they invest.  (See Hellmann and Puri (2002) and 
Kaplan and Stromberg (2004).)  Third, in some cases the incumbent manager may have control over who 
can invest in the company.  As a result, a private equity investor must maintain the incumbent 
management, even if this management is not ideal, or not invest at all.  Finally, concerns about employee 
moral and political turmoil may prompt investors to keep the incumbent management.  All of these 
explanations are consistent with outsiders being more talented than insiders / incumbents. 
 
B.   Correlations and Aggregation 
The individual ratings are highly correlated.  On average, when a candidate scores well on one 
characteristic, the candidate tends to score well on all the others.  Over 85% of the pair-wise correlations 
of the individual characteristics are significant at the 10% level.  To conserve space, we do not report 
these correlations. The strong correlations suggest that talent, ability, or skill have some kind of general 
characteristic or quality that is spread across many dimensions. 
The large number of highly correlated characteristics relative to the number of candidates is 
potentially problematic.  The resulting multicollinearity means that including all the individual 
characteristics as explanatory variables in a regression model leads to results that are difficult to interpret.  
To address this problem, we perform a factor analysis (see Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, and Strahan 
(1999) and Jolliffe (2004)).  This analysis extracts the main variation in the candidates’ characteristics and 
calculates the loadings on these characteristics.  
Table 4 reports the results of this analysis. The first four factors have eigenvalues greater than one 
and explain cumulative 93% of the variation. The first two factors turn out to be more important and have 
natural interpretations.  The first and most important factor is a general factor, explaining 53% of the 
variation in the ratings.  All individual characteristics load positively on this factor, ranging from a 
loading for “integrity” of 0.33 to a loading for “efficiency” of 0.68.  It is natural, therefore, to interpret 
this factor as capturing general talent or ability.  This pattern in the first factor is common in factor 
analysis, and reflects the fact that all the characteristics tend to move together.     14
The second factor is perhaps more interesting.  Candidates who score higher on this factor have 
higher ratings on interpersonal and team-related skills like “treats people with respect,” “open to 
criticism,” “listening skills,” and “team work.”  Candidates with a lower (negative) score on this factor 
have higher ratings on execution-related skills like “moves fast,” “aggressive,” “proactive,” and 
“persistent.”  Interpreting these characteristics, the factor appears to sort the candidates such that a larger 
positive loading corresponds to a candidate with stronger “interpersonal / team player” abilities whereas a 
negative loading corresponds to a candidate who is best characterized as “fast, aggressive, and persistent.” 
This second factor, therefore, also can be interpreted as measuring agreeableness versus conscientiousness 
in the context of the five factor model of the psychology literature.  One might expect Jack Welch – the 
General Electric’ former CEO who was often referred to as “Neutron Jack” – to have a negative score on 
this factor while his successor, Jeff Immelt, cited in Fast Company (2005) for “holding ‘dreaming 
sessions’ with customers and developing ‘imagination breakthrough’ teams,” would likely have a positive 
score.
1  This second factor explains 20% of the variation in the ratings. 
The third factor is more difficult to interpret. It explains only 11% of the variation, and it plays a 
smaller role below. Candidates with higher loadings on this factor score higher on “analytical skills,” 
“organization,” “attention to detail,” and “written communication.”  A candidate with a negative loading 
on this factor scores higher on “enthusiasm” and “persuasion.”  The first set of characteristics evokes a 
sense of deliberate analytic ability and organizational talent; whereas the second set of characteristics 
evokes a sense of being emotional and inspirational.  
Given the difficulty of interpreting increasingly marginal factors, we limit the analysis to the 
initial three factors and primarily the first two. In factor analysis, each factor’s eigenvalue is often taken 
as a measure of the amount of aggregate information captured by the factor, and it is usually argued that 
factors must have eigenvalues greater than one to capture meaningful patterns in the data.  Consistent 
with this, the initial three factors have eigenvalues of 7.7, 3.0, and 1.7.  
                                                             
1 See also “Running G.E., Comfortable in his Skin,” by Joe Nocera, New York Times, June 9, 2007.   15
We also perform a second factor analysis to isolate the distinction captured by the second factor. 
We estimate an alternative factor specification using only the characteristics “fast,” “aggressive,” 
“persistent,” “efficiency,” “proactive,” and “high standards” to capture the negative loadings and 
“respect,” “open to criticism,” “listening skills” and “team work” to capture the positive loadings.  By 
design, this analysis finds two strong factors, with the first factor loading positively on the first set of 
characteristics and the second factor loading positively on the second set.  Although it does not affect the 
loadings dramatically, we also use an oblique quartimin transformation to emphasize the differences.  The 
resulting loadings on the two alternative factors are presented in Panel B of Table 4.  Again, in the context 
of the five factor personality model, the first factor appears to capture conscientiousness; the second 
factor, agreeableness. 
Cronbach’s alpha is used to measure the degree to which a set of characteristics are internally 
consistent.  The characteristics we have included in the two factors in the second factor analysis maximize 
this measure and largely coincide with the characteristics with the largest absolute factor loadings on the 
second factor in the first factor analysis.  The six characteristics in the first alternative factor have a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.85, and the four characteristics in the second alternative factor have an alpha of 
0.84, strongly suggesting that the two sets of characteristics capture internally consistent underlying traits.  
 
IV.   Managerial Characteristics and Hiring Decisions 
In this section, we study the relation between the characteristics and the decision to hire the 
candidate.   
 
A. Average  ratings 
We compare the average ratings of hired candidates to those of non-hired candidates.  We 
distinguish between candidates assessed for LBO and VC firms and between incumbent and outside 
candidates.   Distinguishing between incumbent and outside CEOs is important because in some 
investments, the PE firm does not have the ability to choose an outside CEO.     16
Panel A compares hired versus non-hired candidates overall.  The hired candidates are more 
highly rated on 27 of 30 characteristics; in 12 cases, the differences are significant.  The three 
characteristics for which non-hired candidates score higher, the difference are small and insignificant.  
Panel B looks at VC and LBO candidates separately. For LBO candidates, the hired candidates 
are rated more highly on 24 of 30 characteristics; 10 of those differences are statistically significant.  The 
significant differences include execution-related, neutral, and team-related characteristics.  Non-hired 
candidates are significantly higher on only once characteristic, “analysis,” and only at the 10% level. 
For VC candidates, the hired candidates are rated more highly on all but three characteristics.  
“Brainpower,” “creativity,” “written communication” and “integrity” are statistically significant.  
Panel C looks at incumbents and outsiders separately.  Hired outsiders are more highly rated on 
every characteristic and significantly so on 20 of 30.   While hired incumbents are rated more highly on 
20 of 30 characteristics, only two differences are statistically significant.  This partially reflects the fact 
that most of the incumbents assessed are hired or remain CEOs of their companies.  Again, this suggests 
that for some companies, the CEO and the company are inseparable or, in other words, the PE firm must 
keep the incumbent CEO if it wants to make the investment.  
Panel D restricts the sample to only those companies that assessed more than one candidate.  For 
these companies, the PE firm presumably had some choice in the hiring decision.  The hired candidates 
are rated more highly on 28 of 30 characteristics; 14 are significant.  Again, the significant differences 
include all types of characteristics. 
Overall, these patterns strongly suggest that abilities can be measured and that hiring decisions 
are based on those perceived abilities. 
 
B. Factor  regressions 
Table 6 presents linear regressions that estimate the relation of the likelihood of being hired to the 
CEO candidate’s ratings on each the three primary factors and, also, on the two alternative factors.  Most   17
of the regressions also include a dummy variable for whether the candidate is the incumbent CEO.  All of 
the regressions include year dummies to control for any time variation. 
The first two regressions use the full sample of 316 candidates.  The first regression uses the three 
factors from the factor analysis where the first factor appears to measure general talent and the second 
factor, “team player versus fast and aggressive.”  The regression indicates that the likelihood of being 
hired is strongly related to the first, general talent factor.  The likelihood of being hired also is much 
greater if the candidate is already the CEO, holding talent or skill constant. 
The second regression uses the alternative factors in which the first factor loads on execution-
related abilities and the second factor on interpersonal and team-related abilities.  Hiring is positively 
related to both of these factors, but only the first is statistically significant.  Again, incumbents are 
significantly more likely to be hired. 
The next set of regressions restricts the observations to companies in which the PE firms actually 
invested.  We do this to increase the focus on companies in which the PE firms had a choice in the hiring 
decision.  We first estimate three regressions using the first three factors.  In regression 3, we consider 
only outsider hires.  The PE firms undoubtedly chose to hire these candidates.  The results are similar to 
those for all candidates.  The likelihood of being hired is strongly related to the first, general talent factor. 
The likelihood of being hired is marginally negatively related to the third factor. 
Regressions 4 and 5 consider LBO and VC candidates separately.  The results, however, are 
similar.  The general talent factor is strongly significant in both regressions.  And, again, incumbents are 
significantly more likely to be hired, holding talent constant.  
In the last three regressions, we use the two alternative factors as independent variables.  The 
coefficients on the execution-related factor are positive and significant in all three regressions.  The 
coefficients on the interpersonal and team-related factor are positive in all three, significantly so for the 
LBO candidates.  As in the previous regressions, incumbents are significantly more likely to be hired. 
Overall, then, the regressions strongly suggest that hiring is strongly related to greater general 
talent.  Hiring is not significantly related to the second, “team player” versus “fast aggressive” factor,   18
although the “fast aggressive” factor comes in more strongly for VC candidates.  The regressions also 
indicate that incumbents are more likely to be hired by both LBO and VC-funded companies, holding 
talent equal.  This is consistent with companies placing substantial value on firm- and position-specific 
skills relative to general talent or skills.  
 
V.  Managerial Characteristics and Investment Decisions 
We next look at the relation of investment decisions to CEO candidate characteristics.  Again, we 
distinguish between buyout and VC candidates, incumbent and outside CEO candidates.  We also 
distinguish whether or not the CEOs were hired.   
 
A. Average  ratings 
Panel A of table 7 presents the average ratings of CEO candidates in companies in which the PE 
firms chose to invest compared to the ratings of CEO candidates in companies in which the PE firms did 
not invest.   The first part of the panel looks at all candidates; the second part at incumbents only.  In the 
full sample, invested candidates score higher than non-invested candidates on 28 of 30 characteristics; 9 
are significant.  The significant variables are of all three types, with “efficiency” and “teamwork” having 
the greatest differences.  The results are qualitatively similar, albeit not so strong for incumbents only. 
Panel B considers LBO and VC candidates separately.  Invested candidates score higher than 
non-invested candidates for both LBO and VC; 25 of 30 differences are positive for LBO while 26 of 30 
differences are positive for VC.  Both “efficiency” and “teamwork” are significantly higher for both LBO 
and VC. 
These results suggest that buyout and VC investors condition their investment decision on 
management quality.  
 
B. Factor  regressions   19
In table 8, we present regressions that estimate the likelihood of investment as a function of the 
CEO candidate’s ratings on the three factors and, then, the two alternative factors.  Again, the regressions 
include a dummy variable for whether the candidate is the incumbent CEO and year dummies. 
For the full sample, investment is positively and significantly related to the first general talent 
factor.  This relation is positive both for LBO and VC candidates, but significant only for VC candidates.  
The other two factors are not significant.  For the entire sample, investment is marginally less likely for 
incumbents, although this, too, is driven by the VC candidates.    
The three regressions using the two alternative factors yield positive coefficients on all six 
coefficients.  The “team player” factor is significant for the full sample while the “fast aggressive” factor 
is significant only for the VC candidates.  The pattern for incumbents is the same as in the regression 
using the three basic factors. 
Overall, then, investment decisions are conditioned on management quality, but not so strongly as 
the hiring decisions.   
 
VI.   Managerial Characteristics and Performance 
In this section, we compare the CEO characteristics to CEO and investment success.  We restrict 
the analysis to CEOs who were actually hired.  As described earlier, we use three measures of success.   
First, we rely on direct appraisals of CEO success by the PE firms that invest and hire the CEOs.   
We code a successful CEO at a rating of 1; a mediocre or mixed CEO at 0.5; and an unsuccessful CEO at 
0.   We obtained PE firm appraisals for 81 of the 234 CEOs hired.  
Second, we supplement the PE appraisals with information from public sources.  We classify a 
CEO as successful, if the CEO led the company or another company to a clearly favorable exit such as an 
IPO or sale to another company.  We classify the CEO as unsuccessful if the company went bankrupt, the 
company was sold to another firm under distress or at a substantial loss, or the CEO was removed as CEO 
before any exit occurred.  In a very few cases, we classify the CEO as having mixed success.    20
Third, we create a broad public measure.  This measure begins with the previous measure and 
then classifies additional CEOs as successful if their company has experienced positive press regarding its 
operations or has received additional financing at higher valuations.  Similarly, we classify CEOs as 
unsuccessful, if the company has unfavorable press regarding its operations or subsequent financing.  We 
also classify the CEO as mixed if the company that the CEO ran has not had an exit in any form (IPO, 
sale, liquidation, etc.) and there is no company informative about its success. 
We also considered, but do not report, two measures of financial success.  Again, we first used 
direct appraisals of financial success of 68 investments by the PE firms.  The PE firms classify the deals 
as not successful (the firm lost money), unclear, successful (the investment returned up to two times its 
costs) and very successful (the investment returned more than two times its cost).  Second, we 
supplemented the PE firm answers with information we could obtain from publicly available sources.  We 
only included financial returns if the CEO remained CEO through the exit.  The financial success 
measures are highly correlated with the CEO success measures and generate qualitatively similar results.  
Accordingly, we do not report these results in the tables. 
 
A. Average  ratings 
  Panel A of table 9 compares the ratings of successful CEOs to unsuccessful CEOs using the PE 
measure and the first public measure of success.  We do not report ratings for mixed CEOs in the average 
ratings tables.  (We do include the observations for mixed CEOs in the factor regressions.)  The 
successful CEOs tend to be more highly rated, but few of the differences are significant.  It is more 
informative to look at the LBO and VC candidates separately.  
Panel B presents ratings for LBO and VC candidates using the PE success measure.  For LBOs, 
successful CEOs are rated more highly on 24 of 30 characteristics; 9 are statistically significant.  The 
significant variables are entirely execution-related or neutral.  Not one of the significant variables is team-
related.  The magnitudes of the significant variables are economically meaningful.  For example, the 
success rate of CEOs with a rating of 4 (the top rating) on “efficiency” are 93% and 88% using the PE   21
and public success measures; the analogous success rates for CEOs rated below 4 on “efficiency” are only 
50% and 33%.   
Surprisingly, for VC candidates, successful CEOs are rated higher on only 6 of 30 characteristics.  
Five of the characteristics are significantly negative with “teamwork” and “flexibility” being the most 
negative.  This negative result appears to be strongly related to the technology bust.  When we estimate 
the differences between successful and unsuccessful candidates in a regression framework that includes 
year dummies, successful CEOs are rated more highly on 20 of 30 characteristics.  The coefficients on 
“efficiency” and “attention to details” switch from being negative to positive while the coefficients on 
“teamwork,” “respect,” and “flexibility” remain negatively related to success.  These results are 
confirmed in the factor regressions that include year dummies in the section that follows.  (The results for 
LBO CEOs in panel B are not affected by including year dummies.) 
Panel C of table 9 uses the first public success variable.  For LBOs, again, successful CEOs are 
more highly rated on 27 of 30 characteristics.  Again, none of the interpersonal or team-related variables 
is statistically significant.  Instead, the execution-related and neutral abilities, particularly “efficiency,” 
“organization,” “commitments,” “persistence,” and “proactive” are highly statistically significant.   
For VC CEOs, the results are qualitatively similar to those using the PE success measure.  The 
results also are similarly affected by controlling for year.  When year dummies are included, 24 of the 30 
coefficients become positive.  Again, it is the team-related coefficients that remain negative.  
Panel D of table 9 uses the broad public success measure.  The results are qualitatively similar to 
those for the first public success measure. 
Overall, then, table 9 strongly suggests that more talented CEOs are more successful in LBO 
transactions.  The results for CEOs of VC firms are more difficult to interpret as they appear to be 
affected by the technology bust of the early 2000s.  Both the results for LBOs and VCs suggest, however, 
that execution-related skills are more strongly related to success than team-related skills. 
 
B. Factor  regressions   22
In table 10, we present regressions that estimate the likelihood of success as a function of the 
CEO candidate’s ratings on the three factors and the two alternative factors.  In these regressions, we 
include observations in which CEO success is mixed as 0.5.  (The results are qualitatively identical if we 
exclude the mixed observations and estimate probit regressions.)  Again, the regressions include year 
dummies and, in most cases a dummy variable for whether the candidate is the incumbent CEO.
2 
The regressions in panel A of table 10 combine the entire sample, both LBO and VC CEOs.  
Using the PE measure and the more precise public measure, success is significantly positively related to 
the first “general talent” factor and negatively related to the second, “team player versus execution” 
factor.  Both relations are significant.  When we use the broader public success measure, “team player 
versus execution” factor remains significantly negative while the “general talent” factor does not. 
The coefficients in these regressions are economically meaningful.  A one standard deviation 
increase (0.97) in general talent increases the likelihood of both the PE and public success measures by 
almost 10%.  A one standard deviation increase (0.93) in the “team player versus execution” factor 
reduces the likelihood of PE and public success by almost 19% and 10%, respectively.  
When we estimate the regressions using the alternative factors that separate the “fast aggressive,” 
execution-related and “interpersonal and team-related” factors, we find that the execution-related 
(alternative 1) factor is strongly and significantly positively related to success for all three measures of 
success.  The team-related factor is negatively related to success, although the coefficient is significant 
only using the PE success measure.  The coefficients for the execution-related factor are also 
economically meaningful.  A one standard deviation increase (0.93) in the execution-related factor 
increases the likelihood of PE and public success by almost 18% and 14%, respectively 
Overall, then the results in panel A suggest that success is related to execution-related talent 
rather than team-related talent.  Given that the first factor is significantly related to hiring decisions while 
                                                             
2 The results also are qualitatively unchanged when we include other observables such as CEO age, CEO test scores, 
gender, and industry.  We do not include them in the regressions that we report because we do not have data on all 
observables for all CEOs.  Including all of the observables in the regressions would substantially reduce the number 
of observations.    23
the second factor is not, this result also suggests that firms and investors may overweight team-related 
attributes in hiring and investment decisions. 
The incumbent variable is not significantly related to success in any of the specifications.  One 
interpretation of the insignificant relation of incumbency to performance is that the firm-specific skills did 
not have any impact on ultimate success controlling for CEO talent.   
Panel B of table 10 estimates the success regressions separately for LBO and VC CEOs.  For 
LBO CEOs, all three success measures are significantly positively related to the general talent factor.  All 
three success measures are negatively related to the “team player versus execution” factor with the 
coefficient on PE success being statistically significant.  All three success measures are significantly 
positively related to the “execution-related” alternative factor and unrelated to the “team-related” 
alternative factor.  As with the regressions in panel A, the coefficients are economically meaningful. A 
one standard deviation increase (0.93) in the execution-related factor increases the likelihood of PE and 
public success, respectively, by more than 30% and 25%. 
The patterns are somewhat different for the VC CEOs.  The “general talent” factor is not 
significantly related to any of the success variables.  The “team player versus execution” factor is 
negatively related to all three success measures, significantly so for the PE and public success measures.  
In the alternative factor regressions, success is positively related to the “execution-related” factor and 
negatively related to the “team-related” factor.  The coefficients for the “team-related” factor are 
significant for the two public measures.  The positive coefficients on the “execution-related” factors 
contrast with the negative results in the univariate analysis in table 9.  This confirms the importance of 
controlling for years in the VC analysis.  The regressions also indicate a marginally positive role for 
incumbents holding abilities constant.  The incumbent variable is positive in all of the regressions and is 
marginally significant using the two public measures. 
The results in panel B are broadly consistent with the results in panel A.  Success tends to be 
positively related to execution-related skills, particularly for LBO CEOs, and tends to be unrelated or 
negatively related to team-related skills, particularly for the VC CEOs.   24
Panel C of table 10 estimates success regressions separately for incumbent and outsider CEOs.   
The patterns are qualitatively similar for both types of CEOs and consistent with the conclusions from 
panels A and B.  The PE and public success measures are positively related to the general talent factor 
and negatively related to the “team player versus execution” factor.  The relations with general talent are 
stronger for outsiders.  Similarly, the PE and public success measures are positively significantly related 
to the execution-related alternative factor for both incumbents and outsiders.  The PE success measure is 
negatively significantly related to the team-related alternative factor.   
Again, success tends to be positively related to execution-related skills and negatively to team-
related skills. 
 
VII. Selection  Issues 
It is important to acknowledge the potential selection issues with our analysis.  The candidates in 
our sample have been selected as CEO candidates by the firms in our sample.  As a result, it is possible 
the certain types of companies look for certain types of people or certain characteristics for their CEOs. 
This is the problem of endogenous matching of candidates and companies that arises when unobservable 
characteristics affect which CEOs are hired by particular firms.  For example, if the most promising 
companies hire fast and aggressive CEOs, then we will find that fast and aggressive CEOs perform better.   
We think this type of selection is unlikely to drive our results for several reasons.  First, we think 
it is implausible economically that the most promising firms hire execution oriented CEOs while 
struggling firms hire team and interpersonally oriented candidates.  One might, in fact, expect the 
opposite, in which case our results reasonably could be expected to underestimate the true effect. 
Second, we consider a Heckman selection model in which the first stage is the hiring decision and 
the second stage is the performance relation.  In one specification, we include the incumbent dummy in 
the hiring decision, but exclude it in the performance regressions.  To the extent that the incumbent 
dummy is unrelated to performance (which is plausible for the sample overall and for LBOs), this 
provides exogenous variation in the hiring decision.  When we do this, the results in the performance   25
regressions are qualitatively unchanged.  If selection were a problem, we would expect to see a 
diminution in the performance-characteristic relation.   
In another specification, we use the aggregate ghSMART hiring recommendation in the hiring 
regression.  This helps explain the hiring decision, and, to the extent that it does not contain any more 
information than is in the individual ratings, this also provides exogenous variation in the hiring decision 
not related to performance.  Again, the results in the performance regressions are qualitatively unchanged. 
Third, for companies for which we have more than one CEO assessment, we consider the relation 
of the non-hired CEO candidate(s) characteristics to company performance.  If selection were a problem, 
we would expect the characteristics of candidates who are not hired as the CEO of a particular company 
to be similar to those of the hired candidates and, therefore, to help explain performance. However, we 
find no systematic relation between the qualities of candidates who are not hired for a particular job and 
subsequent outcomes.  
The sample also is selected in that the sample firms are LBO- and VC-funded firms.  These may 
differ in some ways from public, family owned, and other companies.  While we do not have the data to 
address this issue, we discuss the likelihood that our results generalize in the summary and conclusions. 
 
 VIII.  Summary and Conclusion 
Using a novel dataset of assessments of CEO candidates of companies involved in private equity 
transactions (PE), we study how CEO characteristics and abilities relate to hiring decisions, PE firms’ 
investment decisions, and subsequent performance.  The candidates are assessed on more than 30 
individual characteristics.  To our knowledge, this is the first systematic study with this level of detail on 
CEOs’ specific characteristics, skills and abilities.    
First, when studying the characteristics and abilities, we find that CEO ratings are strongly 
positively correlated across characteristics and abilities.  A factor analysis of these characteristics 
generates two strong factors that can be characterized as a general talent factor and a factor that contrasts   26
interpersonal and team-related skills with execution-related skills.  We also find that outsiders are rated 
more highly than incumbents, particularly for buyout firms. 
Next, we relate the abilities and characteristics to hiring and investment decisions.  CEOs appear 
to be hired based on general ratings or talent.  Many individual abilities are significant, particularly for 
outsider hires.  Those abilities can be characterized as interpersonal / team-related, execution-related, and 
neutral.  There is a strong tendency to hire incumbent CEOs, holding ratings or talent constant.  We also 
find that both LBO and VC investors tend to invest in more highly rated CEOs. 
Finally, we relate the characteristics and abilities to subsequent performance or success.  Success 
tends to be positively related to execution-related skills, particularly for LBO CEOs, and tends to be 
unrelated or negatively related to team-related skills, particularly for the VC CEOs.  Success is not related 
to incumbency for LBO CEOs and, at best, only marginally for VC CEOs. 
We believe our results have several implications.  First, it is possible to measure individual CEO 
talents and skills over and above the usual observable variables like age, industry and college SAT scores.  
Second, the CEO talents and skills appear to matter in that they are consistently correlated with 
hiring, investment, and performance. 
Third, success and performance are more strongly correlated with execution-related skills than 
with interpersonal and team-related skills, conditional on hiring a CEO.  In other words, CEOs with the 
execution-related skills of a Jack Welch appear more successful than CEOs with the more team-related 
skills of Jeff Immelt.  This is consistent with the prediction in Bolton et al. (2008) that more “resolute, 
steadfast CEOs who stick to their guns tend to be better leaders than ‘good listeners’.”  It also is 
consistent with results in the psychology literature that tend to find “conscientiousness” is the best 
predictor of performance.  Our results are consistent with Collins’ (2001) findings that “Level 5” CEOs 
have unwavering resolve, are fanatically driven, and exhibit workmanlike diligence.  At the same time, 
our results do not support Collins’ findings that successful CEOs exhibit compelling modesty, build 
strong teams, and give credit to others / take blame on themselves.   27
Fourth, while team-related skills are significantly related to hiring and investment decisions, they 
are not related to success and performance.  This suggests that, on the margin, team-related skills may be 
overweighted in hiring decisions.  It is worth addressing the fact that this suggests that firms do not 
always make optimal hiring decisions.  This may occur because an ideal candidate is not available or 
because private benefits (e.g., of a founder) affect the decision.  It also may occur because investors and 
companies do not have the right information or decision rules to compare candidates and need to learn. 
Fifth, incumbent or insider CEOs are no more successful than outside candidates, holding talent 
constant, particularly for LBOs.  This is consistent with the predictions of Murphy and Zabonjik (2004) 
and others, and less consistent with the admonition in Khurana (2002) to focus on insiders and avoid 
outsiders.  Our results suggest that investors should hire the CEO candidate with the most talent.  
Finally, we recognize that the data and analysis have limitations.  First, the results reflect buyout 
and VC-funded companies.  While these are two quite different groups, these types of companies may 
have specific needs and, therefore, the results may not generalize to all companies.  Second, the 
performance data are coarse and potentially noisy.  
That said, the correlation of our results with the description of the “Effective Executive” in 
Drucker (1967) is suggestive.  Drucker based his work on personal observation of all types of executives, 
but, particularly, public company executives.  According to Drucker, effective executives “differ widely 
in their personalities, strengths, weaknesses, values and beliefs.  All they have in common is they get the 
right things done.”  Those “right things,” detailed in separate chapters, include utilizing time efficiently, 
focusing on contribution, making strengths productive, doing first things first, and making effective or 
rational decisions.  The attributes are largely execution-related and appear to correspond well to the 
“efficient,” “persistent,” “proactive,” “commitment,” and “analytical” skills in our study.   28
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Time Funds,” working paper, Duke University. TABLE 1: This table contains descriptions of the characteristics assessed by ghSMART for 316 CEO candidates.  
 
 Description  of  Characteristic  Description of a Candidate with a 
high score on this characteristic 
Description of a Candidate with a 
low score on this characteristic 
Leadership:      
Hires A Players  Sources, recruits,hires A Players.  Hires A Players 90% of the time.  Hires A Players 25% of the time. 
Develops People 
Coaches people in their current roles to 
improve performance, and prepares them 
for future roles. 
Teams say that Candidate gives a lot 
of coaching / development.  Many 
team members go on to bigger roles. 
Teams do not say on Candidate gives a 
lot of coaching. Team members do not 
go on to do better things. 
Removes Underperformers 
Removes C Players within 180 days.  
Achieves this through coaching-out, 
redeployment, demotion, or termination. 
Removes C Players within 180 days 
of taking a new role or hiring the 
person. 
May remove occasional C Player, but 
keeps most of them, often for years. 
Treats People with Respect 
Values others, treating them fairly and 
showing concern for their views and 
feelings. 
Teams would say Candidate is fair 
and respectful.  Candidate describes 
performance in terms of team efforts. 
Candidate is self-absorbed. Team 
members might call Candidate 
abrasive, rough around the edges. 
Efficiency  Able to produce significant output with 
minimal wasted effort. 
Candidate gets a lot done in a short 
period of time. 
Candidate’s output is unimpressive.  He 
is a “thinker” with poor execution. 
Network of Talented People  Possesses a large network of talented 
people. 
Candidate has a proven ability to 
build a network very quickly. 
Candidate does not have big network 
and shows limited ability to build one. 
Flexible/Adaptable 
Adjusts quickly to changing priorities and 
conditions. Copes with complexity and 
change. 
Candidate is not bothered by new or 
changing circumstances.  Faces 
change in a matter-of-fact manner. 
Candidate bristles when changes take 
place, often blames others for not doing 
their jobs. 
 
Personal:      
Integrity  Does not cut corners ethically.  Earns 
trust and maintains confidences. 
Takes pride in always doing what is 
right. 
Cuts corners, unaware of how actions 
are borderline unethical. 
Organization and Planning  Plans, organizes, schedules, and budgets 
in an efficient, productive manner. 
Job accomplishments closely match 
goals.  Candidate sets priorities. 
Candidates’ accomplishments do not 
match goals, and individual meanders. 
Calm Under Pressure  Maintains stable performance when under 
heavy pressure or stress. 
Performs under a wide variety of 
circumstances, regardless of stress. 
Overreacts to high pressure situations.  
Fails to accomplish goals under stress. 
Aggressive but respectful  Moves quickly and takes a forceful stand 
without being overly abrasive. 
Candidate sticks neck out with words 
and actions, even if upsets others. 
Candidate takes a wait-and-see attitude, 
moving more slowly to minimize risk. 
Moves Fast  Takes action quickly without getting 
bogged down by obstacles. 
Candidate takes action and gets a lot 
done in a short period of time. 
Candidate is slow to accomplish 
results. 
Follows through on 
Commitments 
Lives up to verbal and written 
agreements, regardless of personal cost.  Gets the job done, no matter what.  Does not live up to verbal or written 
agreements. Intellectual:      
Brainpower  Learns quickly.  Demonstrates ability to 
quickly understand and absorb new info. 
High GPA and SAT scores, ability to 
pick-up new job details quickly. 
Low GPA and SAT scores.  May remain 
in same role for a long time. 
Analytical Skills  Structures and processes qualitative or 
quantitative data and draws conclusions. 
Cites multiple examples of problem 
solving skills. 
Rarely solves problems through analysis.  
Heavy reliance on gut. 
Strategic Thinking/Visioning  Able to see and communicate the big 
picture in an inspiring way. 
Holds a big vision for current and 
future roles.  Inspires others vision. 
Does not have a vision for current or 
future roles.  Does not value planning. 
Creative/Innovative  Generates new and innovative approaches 
to problems. 
Offers new and innovative solutions to 
intractable problems many times.  Rarely offers creative solutions. 
Attention to Detail  Does not let important details slip through 
the cracks or derail a project. 
Makes time to review the details. Asks 
penetrating questions. 
Makes many mistakes because of 
ignoring small, but important details. 
Motivational:      
Enthusiasm  Exhibits passion and excitement over work. 
Has a “can do” attitude. 
Displays high energy and a passion for 
the work.. 
Displays low energy and limited passion 
for the work. 
Persistence  Demonstrates tenacity and willingness to go 
the distance to get something done. 
Never gives up.  Sticks with 
assignments until they are done. 
Has a track record of giving up. 
Proactive /Initiative  Acts without being told what to do.  Brings 
new ideas to company. 
Regularly brings new ideas into an 
organization.  Self directed. 
Never brings in new ideas.  Takes 
direction / does not act until being told. 
Work Ethic  Possesses a strong willingness to work hard 
and long hours to get the job done. 
Works long, hard hours to get the job 
done.  Does just enough to get the job done. 
Sets High Standards  Expects personal performance and team 
performance to be the best. 
Expects top performance from himself 
and from others around him. 
Allows himself to do 80% of the job /  
lets poor performance from others slide 
Interpersonal:      
Listening Skills  Lets others speak and seeks to understand 
their viewpoints. 
Displays ability to listen to others to 
understand meaning. 
Cuts people off, does not address 
questions, misunderstands. 
Open to Criticism and Ideas  Often solicits feedback and reacts calmly to 
receiving criticism. 
Responds to criticism by finding ways 
to grow and become better. 
Reacts to criticism by blaming others and 
becoming bitter. 
Written Communication  Writes clearly and articulately using correct 
grammar. 
Demonstrates ability to write clearly in 
all forms of communication. 
Does not offer any evidence of being a 
strong writer. 
Oral Communication  Speaks clearly and articulately without 
being overly verbose or talkative. 
Speaks clearly, articulately, and 
succinctly. 
Speaks too quickly or too slowly, 
mumbles, uses a lot of jargon, etc. 
Teamwork  Reaches out to peers and cooperates with 
supervisors to establish relationship. 
Recognizes the power of a strong team, 
and works collaboratively. 
Prefers to operate in isolation.  May not 
work harmoniously with others. 
Persuasion  Able to convince others to pursue a course 
of action 
Convinces others to take a course of 
action, even if initially in opposition. 
Fails to or never tries to convince others 
to take a course of action. 
Holds People Accountable  Sets goals for team and follows-up to ensure 
progress toward completion. 
Sets goals, follows-up, and holds 
people accountable for shortfalls. 
Does not set goals, follow-up, or hold 
people accountable. 
 TABLE 2:  Descriptive tabulations of 316 CEO candidates assessed by ghSMART with respect to whether 
assessed candidates are hired or not, incumbents or outsiders, assessed by LBO or VC investors, successful 
or not, and the number of candidates assessed for each company. 
 
 
Panel A: Hiring and Incumbency 
Full Sample          
 Hired     
Incumbent  0 1    Total 
0  80  65  145 
1  12  159  171 
Total  92  224  316 
       
 
Panel B: Hiring and Investments by Investor Type and Incumbency 
Full Sample          
 Hired     
Invest  0 1    Total 
0  26  56  82 
1  66  168  234 
Total  92  224  316 
        
Buyout Investors          
 Hired     
Invest 0  1  Total 
0  16  18  34 
1  33  81  114 
Total 49  99  148 
        
Venture Capital Investors    
 Hired     
Invest 0  1  Total 
0  10  38  48 
1  33  87  120 
Total 43  125  168 
              
Outsiders (Incumbent = 0)    
 Hired     
Invest  0 1    Total 
0  25  4  29 
1  55  61  116 
Total  80  65  145 
        
Insiders (Incumbent = 1)    
 Hired     
Invest  0 1    Total 
0  1  52  53 
1  11  107  118 
Total  12  159  171 
              
 Panel C:  Incumbency and Hiring Decisions by Investment 
PE Firm Invested (181 Companies) 
 Hired     
Incumbent  0  1  Total 
0  55  61  116 
1  11  107  118 
Total  66  168  234 
        
        
PE Firm Not Invested (77 Companies) 
 Hired     
Incumbent  0  1  Total 
0  25  4  29 
1  1  52  53 
Total  26  56  82 
              
 
Panel D: PE and Public Success Measures 
   Success (PE Measure)        Success 
(Public 
Measure)  0  0.5  1  .  Total 
0  30  4  0  33  67 
0.5  0  3  0  2  5  
1  0  2  37  15  54 
.  0  5  0  93  98 
Total  30  14  37  143    224 
 
Panel E: Broad and Public Success Measures 
   Success (Broad Measure)     Success 
(Public 
Measure)  0  0.5  1  .  Total 
0  64  2  0  1  67 
0.5  0  4  1  0  5  
1  0  0  54  0  54 
.  20  26  37  15  98 
Total  84  32  92  16    224 
 
Panel F: Candidates Assessed Per Company 
Candidates 
Interviewed  Freq. 
1  219 
2  26 
3  9 
4  2 
5  2 
Total  258 
 TABLE 3:  Mean rating, standard deviation, minimum and maximum ratings for each individual 
characteristic for 316 CEO candidates assessed by ghSMART. A higher number reflects a better rating. 
 
Panel A: Distribution of Individual Ratings 
   Mean  Obs.  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Hires A Players  2.201  [314]  1.139  1  4 
Develops People  2.248  [315]  1.138  1  4 
Removes Underperformers  1.914  [314]  1.131  1  4 
Respect 2.910  [310]  1.233  1  4 
Efficiency 2.868  [311]  1.158  1  4 
Network 2.619  [312]  1.197  1  4 
Flexibility 2.603  [310]  1.212  1  4 
Integrity 3.594  [308]  0.851  1  4 
Organization 2.752  [311]  1.183  1  4 
Calm 3.188  [309]  1.055  1  4 
Aggressive 3.136  [308]  1.037  1  4 
Fast 3.023  [309]  1.115  1  4 
Commitments 3.340  [312]  0.966  1  4 
Brainpower 2.865  [312]  1.103  1  4 
Analysis 2.579  [311]  1.239  1  4 
Strategic 2.562  [313]  1.226  1  4 
Creative 2.671  [313]  1.142  1  4 
Attention to Details  2.170  [312]  1.162  1  4 
Enthusiasm 3.016  [313]  1.079  1  4 
Persistence 3.425  [294]  0.909  1  4 
Proactive 3.354  [308]  0.993  1  4 
Work Ethics  3.564  [312]  0.795  1  4 
High Standards  2.961  [311]  1.106  1  4 
Listening Skills  2.534  [313]  1.214  1  4 
Open to Criticism  2.287  [307]  1.192  1  4 
Written Communication  2.672  [244]  1.210  1  4 
Oral Communication  2.961  [311]  1.034  1  4 
Teamwork 2.707  [311]  1.200  1  4 
Persuasion 2.955  [313]  1.097  1  4 
Accountable 2.545  [308]  1.189  1  4 
 Panel B:  Comparison of Buyout and Venture Capital deals and Incumbents and Outsiders. 
   Buyout     Venture Capital          Incumbents     Outsiders         
 Mean  Obs.    Mean  Obs.    Means  P-value  Mean  Obs.    Mean  Obs.    Means  P-value  
Hires A Players  2.143  [147]     2.251  [167]     -0.108  0.400    2.012  [169]     2.421  [145]     -0.409  0.001 *** 
Develops People  2.257  [148]    2.240  [167]    0.017  0.894  2.088  [170]    2.434  [145]    -0.346  0.007 *** 
Removes Underperformers  1.932  [147]    1.898  [167]    0.034  0.792  1.834  [169]    2.007  [145]    -0.173  0.178  
Respect 3.082  [147]    2.755  [163]    0.327  0.019 ** 2.929  [169]    2.887  [141]    0.042  0.763  
Efficiency 2.808  [146]    2.921  [165]    -0.113  0.391  2.740  [169]    3.021  [142]    -0.281  0.032 ** 
Network 2.667  [147]    2.576  [165]    0.091  0.504  2.497  [169]    2.762  [143]    -0.265  0.051 * 
Flexibility 2.747  [146]    2.476  [164]    0.271  0.049 ** 2.518  [168]    2.704  [142]    -0.186  0.178  
Integrity 3.648  [145]    3.546  [163]    0.102  0.293  3.588  [165]    3.601  [143]    -0.014  0.890  
Organization 2.767  [146]    2.739  [165]    0.028  0.837  2.619  [168]    2.909  [143]    -0.290  0.031 ** 
Calm 3.103  [145]    3.262  [164]    -0.159  0.187  3.137  [168]    3.248  [141]    -0.111  0.357  
Aggressive 3.116  [146]    3.154  [162]    -0.038  0.749  3.222  [167]    3.035  [141]    0.186  0.117  
Fast 3.014  [145]    3.030  [164]    -0.016  0.896  3.060  [168]    2.979  [141]    0.081  0.527  
Commitments 3.483  [147]    3.212  [165]    0.271  0.013 ** 3.320  [169]    3.364  [143]    -0.044  0.688  
Brainpower 2.755  [147]    2.964  [165]    -0.209  0.096 * 2.935  [168]    2.785  [144]    0.150  0.232  
Analysis 2.514  [144]    2.635  [167]    -0.121  0.392  2.462  [169]    2.718  [142]    -0.257  0.069 * 
Strategic 2.422  [147]    2.687  [166]    -0.265  0.056 * 2.618  [170]    2.497  [143]    0.121  0.385  
Creative 2.660  [147]    2.681  [166]    -0.021  0.872  2.781  [169]    2.542  [144]    0.239  0.065 * 
Attention to Details  2.422  [147]    1.945  [165]    0.477  0.000 ***  2.113  [168]    2.236  [144]    -0.123  0.352  
Enthusiasm 3.108  [148]    2.933  [165]    0.175  0.153  3.035  [170]    2.993  [143]    0.042  0.730  
Persistence 3.582  [141]    3.281  [153]    0.301  0.004 ***  3.484  [159]    3.356  [135]    0.129  0.227  
Proactive 3.441  [145]    3.276  [163]    0.165  0.145  3.395  [167]    3.305  [141]    0.090  0.427  
Work Ethics  3.596  [146]    3.536  [166]    0.060  0.509  3.521  [167]    3.614  [145]    -0.093  0.305  
High Standards  3.054  [147]    2.878  [164]    0.176  0.161  2.869  [168]    3.070  [143]    -0.201  0.111  
Listening Skills  2.696  [148]    2.388  [165]    0.308  0.025 ** 2.482  [170]    2.594  [143]    -0.112  0.417  
Open to Criticism  2.462  [145]    2.130  [162]    0.332  0.014 ** 2.204  [167]    2.386  [140]    -0.182  0.183  
Written Communication  2.630  [127]    2.718  [117]    -0.088  0.571  2.677  [130]    2.667  [114]    0.010  0.947  
Oral Communication  2.966  [147]    2.957  [164]    0.009  0.941  2.846  [169]    3.099  [142]    -0.252  0.032 ** 
Teamwork 2.808  [146]    2.618  [165]    0.190  0.164  2.675  [169]    2.746  [142]    -0.072  0.599  
Persuasion 3.007  [148]    2.909  [165]    0.098  0.432  2.971  [170]    2.937  [143]    0.034  0.788  
Accountable 2.648  [145]     2.454  [163]     0.194  0.153    2.361  [166]     2.761  [142]     -0.399  0.003 *** Panel C: Comparison of Incumbents and Outsiders for Buyout and Venture Capital Deals. 
   Buyout     Venture Capital    
 Incumbents    Outsiders      Incumbents    Outsiders      
 Mean  Obs.     Mean  Obs.     Means  P-value  Mean  Obs.     Mean  Obs.     Means  P-value  
Hires A Players  1.868  [68]    2.380  [79]    -0.512  0.005 ***  2.109  [101]    2.470  [66]    -0.361  0.050 ** 
Develops People  2.029  [69]    2.456  [79]    -0.427  0.026 ** 2.129  [101]    2.409  [66]    -0.280  0.112  
Removes Underperformers  1.735  [68]    2.101  [79]    -0.366  0.049 ** 1.901  [101]    1.894  [66]    0.007  0.969  
Respect 3.132  [68]    3.038  [79]    0.094  0.620  2.792  [101]    2.694  [62]    0.099  0.638  
Efficiency 2.706  [68]    2.897  [78]    -0.192  0.303  2.762  [101]    3.172  [64]    -0.409  0.031 ** 
Network 2.500  [68]    2.810  [79]    -0.310  0.128  2.495  [101]    2.703  [64]    -0.208  0.267  
Flexibility 2.603  [68]    2.872  [78]    -0.269  0.179  2.460  [100]    2.500  [64]    -0.040  0.837  
Integrity 3.652  [66]    3.646  [79]    0.006  0.964  3.545  [99]    3.547  [64]    -0.001  0.992  
Organization 2.500  [68]    3.000  [78]    -0.500  0.009 ***  2.700  [100]    2.800  [65]    -0.100  0.602  
Calm 3.030  [67]    3.167  [78]    -0.137  0.428  3.208  [101]    3.349  [63]    -0.141  0.414  
Aggressive 3.179  [67]    3.063  [79]    0.116  0.505  3.250  [100]    3.000  [62]    0.250  0.136  
Fast 3.059  [68]    2.974  [77]    0.085  0.662  3.060  [100]    2.984  [64]    0.076  0.662  
Commitments 3.588  [68]    3.392  [79]    0.196  0.190  3.139  [101]    3.328  [64]    -0.190  0.239  
Brainpower 2.676  [68]    2.823  [79]    -0.146  0.434  3.110  [100]    2.738  [65]    0.372  0.030 ** 
Analysis 2.191  [68]    2.803  [76]    -0.611  0.003 ***  2.644  [101]    2.621  [66]    0.022  0.909  
Strategic 2.377  [69]    2.462  [78]    -0.085  0.667  2.782  [101]    2.538  [65]    0.244  0.221  
Creative 2.691  [68]    2.633  [79]    0.058  0.766  2.842  [101]    2.431  [65]    0.411  0.020 ** 
Attention to Details  2.338  [68]    2.494  [79]    -0.155  0.437  1.960  [100]    1.923  [65]    0.037  0.831  
Enthusiasm 3.188  [69]    3.038  [79]    0.150  0.390  2.931  [101]    2.938  [64]    -0.007  0.969  
Persistence 3.708  [65]    3.474  [76]    0.234  0.078 * 3.330  [94]    3.203  [59]    0.126  0.444  
Proactive 3.426  [68]    3.455  [77]    -0.028  0.859  3.374  [99]    3.125  [64]    0.249  0.133  
Work Ethics  3.507  [67]    3.671  [79]    -0.163  0.221  3.530  [100]    3.545  [66]    -0.015  0.902  
High Standards  2.912  [68]    3.177  [79]    -0.265  0.142  2.840  [100]    2.938  [64]    -0.098  0.587  
Listening Skills  2.667  [69]    2.722  [79]    -0.055  0.780  2.356  [101]    2.438  [64]    -0.081  0.679  
Open to Criticism  2.309  [68]    2.597  [77]    -0.289  0.142  2.131  [99]    2.127  [63]    0.004  0.982  
Written Communication  2.456  [57]    2.771  [70]    -0.315  0.126  2.849  [73]    2.500  [44]    0.349  0.151  
Oral Communication  2.794  [68]    3.114  [79]    -0.320  0.054 * 2.881  [101]    3.079  [63]    -0.198  0.247  
Teamwork 2.735  [68]    2.872  [78]    -0.137  0.482  2.634  [101]    2.594  [64]    0.040  0.839  
Persuasion 3.029  [69]    2.987  [79]    0.042  0.817  2.931  [101]    2.875  [64]    0.056  0.754  
Accountable 2.388  [67]     2.872  [78]     -0.484  0.014 ** 2.343  [99]     2.625  [64]     -0.282  0.140   
 TABLE 4  Panel A presents factors loadings on the four main factors based on 30 characteristics for 316 
CEO candidates assessed by ghSMART.  Panel B presents factors loadings on the two concentrated factors 
after an oblique quartimin rotation.  Loadings with absolute values less than 0.1 are left blank.  
 
Panel A: Factor Loadings for Individual Characteristics 
   Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 3  Factor 4 
Hires A Players  0.552    0.206  -0.108 
Develops People  0.512  0.274    -0.180 
Removes Underperformers  0.452  -0.135  0.244  -0.236 
Respect 0.355  0.651  -0.179   
Efficiency 0.683  -0.135    -0.104 
Network 0.582       
Flexibility 0.535  0.246  -0.108  0.110 
Integrity 0.329  0.322     
Organization 0.516    0.427  -0.117 
Calm 0.373  0.258     
Aggressive 0.482  -0.481  -0.231   
Fast 0.504  -0.535  -0.241   
Commitments 0.629  -0.125    -0.213 
Brainpower 0.483  -0.182  0.260  0.434 
Analysis 0.461  -0.106  0.503  0.251 
Strategic 0.529  -0.199  0.110  0.474 
Creative 0.468  -0.133    0.386 
Attention to Details  0.341  0.149  0.351  -0.231 
Enthusiasm 0.440  0.156  -0.463   
Persistence 0.564  -0.347  -0.288   
Proactive 0.657  -0.332  -0.273   
Work Ethics  0.430  -0.278     
High Standards  0.664  -0.267    -0.252 
Listening Skills  0.450  0.599     
Open to Criticism  0.441  0.616     
Written Communication  0.444  0.139  0.306  0.316 
Oral Communication  0.521  0.237  -0.124  0.156 
Teamwork 0.514  0.519  -0.145   
Persuasion 0.553    -0.405  0.123 
Accountable 0.548  -0.218  0.291  -0.385 
 
Panel B: Factor loadings for Concentrated Factors 
   Alt. Factor 1 Alt. Factor 2 
Fast 0.780   
Aggressive 0.731   
Persistence 0.706   
Efficiency 0.594   
Proactive 0.771   
High Standards  0.636   
Respect    0.734 
Open to Criticism    0.774 
Listening Skills    0.761 
Teamwork     0.720 TABLE 5 Characteristics and Hiring Decisions.  Mean ratings of hired and non-hired candidates from 316 CEO candidates assessed by ghSMART.  
 Panel A: Comparison of Hired and Non-hired Candidates. 
   Hired     Not Hired         
 Mean  Obs.   Mean  Obs.  Diff. means  P-value  
Hires A Players  2.221  [222]    2.152  [92]    0.069  0.628  
Develops People  2.287  [223]    2.152  [92]    0.135  0.340  
Removes Underperformers  1.955  [222]    1.815  [92]    0.140  0.320  
Respect 2.950  [219]    2.813  [91]    0.137  0.375  
Efficiency 2.900  [219]    2.793  [92]    0.106  0.462  
Network 2.602  [221]    2.659  [91]    -0.058  0.700  
Flexibility 2.626  [219]    2.549  [91]    0.076  0.615  
Integrity 3.648  [219]    3.461  [89]    0.188  0.079 * 
Organization 2.795  [219]    2.652  [92]    0.142  0.334  
Calm 3.196  [219]    3.167  [90]    0.030  0.823  
Aggressive 3.226  [217]    2.923  [91]    0.303  0.019 ** 
Fast 3.100  [219]    2.833  [90]    0.267  0.056 * 
Committments 3.437  [222]    3.100  [90]    0.337  0.005 *** 
Brainpower 2.914  [220]    2.750  [92]    0.164  0.233  
Analysis 2.568  [220]    2.604  [91]    -0.036  0.815  
Strategic 2.624  [221]    2.413  [92]    0.211  0.165  
Creative 2.765  [221]    2.446  [92]    0.319  0.024 ** 
Attention to Details  2.227  [220]    2.033  [92]    0.195  0.178  
Enthusiasm 3.131  [222]    2.736  [91]    0.394  0.003 *** 
Persistence 3.502  [209]    3.235  [85]    0.267  0.022 ** 
Proactive 3.426  [216]    3.185  [92]    0.241  0.051 * 
Work Ethics  3.586  [220]    3.511  [92]    0.075  0.445  
High Standards  2.995  [220]    2.879  [91]    0.116  0.400  
Listening Skills  2.563  [222]    2.462  [91]    0.102  0.503  
Open to Criticism  2.359  [217]    2.111  [90]    0.248  0.097 * 
Written Communication  2.766  [167]    2.468  [77]    0.299  0.073 * 
Oral Communication  2.991  [221]    2.889  [90]    0.102  0.431  
Teamwork 2.795  [220]    2.495  [91]    0.301  0.044 ** 
Persuasion 3.036  [222]    2.758  [91]    0.278  0.042 ** 
Accountable 2.537  [218]     2.567  [90]     -0.030  0.841   Panel B: Comparison of Hired and Non-hired Candidates for Buyout and Venture Capital deals. 
   Buyout     Venture Capital    
 Hired    Non-Hired      Hired    Non-Hired      
 Mean  Obs.     Mean  Obs.     Means  P-value  Mean  Obs.     Mean  Obs.     Means  P-value  
Hires A Players  2.112  [98]    2.204  [49]    -0.092  0.638  2.306  [124]    2.093  [43]    0.213  0.302  
Develops People  2.273  [99]    2.224  [49]    0.048  0.814  2.298  [124]    2.070  [43]    0.229  0.248  
Removes Underperformers  1.969  [98]    1.857  [49]    0.112  0.571  1.944  [124]    1.767  [43]    0.176  0.384  
Respect 3.163  [98]    2.918  [49]    0.245  0.222  2.777  [121]    2.690  [42]    0.086  0.710  
Efficiency 2.825  [97]    2.776  [49]    0.049  0.802  2.959  [122]    2.814  [43]    0.145  0.495  
Network 2.653  [98]    2.694  [49]    -0.041  0.850  2.561  [123]    2.619  [42]    -0.058  0.782  
Flexibility 2.845  [97]    2.551  [49]    0.294  0.163  2.451  [122]    2.548  [42]    -0.097  0.656  
Integrity 3.660  [97]    3.625  [48]    0.035  0.803  3.639  [122]    3.268  [41]    0.371  0.023 ** 
Organization 2.753  [97]    2.796  [49]    -0.043  0.833  2.828  [122]    2.488  [43]    0.339  0.111  
Calm 3.124  [97]    3.062  [48]    0.061  0.738  3.254  [122]    3.286  [42]    -0.032  0.870  
Aggressive 3.227  [97]    2.898  [49]    0.329  0.071 * 3.225  [120]    2.952  [42]    0.273  0.143  
Fast 3.135  [96]    2.776  [49]    0.360  0.077 * 3.073  [123]    2.902  [41]    0.171  0.381  
Commitments 3.636  [99]    3.167  [48]    0.470  0.003 ***  3.276  [123]    3.024  [42]    0.253  0.160  
Brainpower 2.714  [98]    2.837  [49]    -0.122  0.536  3.074  [122]    2.651  [43]    0.423  0.026 ** 
Analysis 2.385  [96]    2.771  [48]    -0.385  0.080 * 2.710  [124]    2.419  [43]    0.291  0.183  
Strategic 2.449  [98]    2.367  [49]    0.082  0.696  2.764  [123]    2.465  [43]    0.299  0.177  
Creative 2.755  [98]    2.469  [49]    0.286  0.167  2.772  [123]    2.419  [43]    0.354  0.072 * 
Attention to Details  2.541  [98]    2.184  [49]    0.357  0.090 * 1.975  [122]    1.860  [43]    0.115  0.549  
Enthusiasm 3.303  [99]    2.714  [49]    0.589  0.001 ***  2.992  [123]    2.762  [42]    0.230  0.241  
Persistence 3.713  [94]    3.319  [47]    0.394  0.005 ***  3.330  [115]    3.132  [38]    0.199  0.284  
Proactive 3.542  [96]    3.245  [49]    0.297  0.073 * 3.333  [120]    3.116  [43]    0.217  0.238  
Work Ethics  3.639  [97]    3.510  [49]    0.129  0.360  3.545  [123]    3.512  [43]    0.033  0.814  
High Standards  3.102  [98]    2.959  [49]    0.143  0.456  2.910  [122]    2.786  [42]    0.124  0.536  
Listening Skills  2.737  [99]    2.612  [49]    0.125  0.548  2.423  [123]    2.286  [42]    0.137  0.532  
Open to Criticism  2.577  [97]    2.229  [48]    0.348  0.094 * 2.183  [120]    1.976  [42]    0.207  0.331  
Written Communication  2.634  [82]    2.622  [45]    0.012  0.956  2.894  [85]    2.250  [32]    0.644  0.014 ** 
Oral Communication  2.990  [98]    2.918  [49]    0.071  0.685  2.992  [123]    2.854  [41]    0.138  0.473  
Teamwork 2.928  [97]    2.571  [49]    0.356  0.081 * 2.691  [123]    2.405  [42]    0.286  0.193  
Persuasion 3.111  [99]    2.796  [49]    0.315  0.096 * 2.976  [123]    2.714  [42]    0.261  0.188  
Accountable 2.619  [97]     2.708  [48]     -0.090  0.670    2.471  [121]     2.405  [42]     0.066  0.756   
 Panel C: Comparison of Hired and Non-Hired Candidates for Incumbents and Outsiders. 
   Incumbent     Outsider    
   Hired     Non-Hired         Hired     Non-Hired         
 Mean  Obs.     Mean  Obs.    Means  P-value  Mean  Obs.     Mean  Obs.     Means  P-value  
Hires A Players  2.057  [157]    1.417  [12]    0.641  0.064 * 2.615  [65]    2.263  [80]    0.353  0.051 * 
Develops People  2.089  [158]    2.083  [12]    0.005  0.988  2.769  [65]    2.163  [80]    0.607  0.001 *** 
Removes Underperformers  1.885  [157]    1.167  [12]    0.719  0.030 ** 2.123  [65]    1.913  [80]    0.211  0.275  
Respect 2.917  [157]    3.083  [12]    -0.166  0.658  3.032  [62]    2.772  [79]    0.260  0.210  
Efficiency 2.752  [157]    2.583  [12]    0.168  0.651  3.274  [62]    2.825  [80]    0.449  0.010 *** 
Network 2.490  [157]    2.583  [12]    -0.093  0.804  2.875  [64]    2.671  [79]    0.204  0.282  
Flexibility 2.506  [156]    2.667  [12]    -0.160  0.661  2.921  [63]    2.532  [79]    0.389  0.056 * 
Integrity 3.584  [154]    3.636  [11]    -0.052  0.849  3.800  [65]    3.436  [78]    0.364  0.009 *** 
Organization 2.641  [156]    2.333  [12]    0.308  0.406  3.175  [63]    2.700  [80]    0.475  0.010 *** 
Calm 3.121  [157]    3.364  [11]    -0.243  0.495  3.387  [62]    3.139  [79]    0.248  0.124  
Aggressive 3.226  [155]    3.167  [12]    0.059  0.851  3.226  [62]    2.886  [79]    0.340  0.050 ** 
Fast 3.064  [156]    3.000  [12]    0.064  0.850  3.190  [63]    2.808  [78]    0.383  0.040 ** 
Commitments 3.342  [158]    3.000  [11]    0.342  0.267  3.672  [64]    3.114  [79]    0.558  0.000 *** 
Brainpower 2.955  [156]    2.667  [12]    0.288  0.388  2.812  [64]    2.763  [80]    0.050  0.786  
Analysis 2.503  [157]    1.917  [12]    0.587  0.113  2.730  [63]    2.709  [79]    0.021  0.919  
Strategic 2.646  [158]    2.250  [12]    0.396  0.294  2.571  [63]    2.438  [80]    0.134  0.507  
Creative 2.745  [157]    3.250  [12]    -0.505  0.135  2.812  [64]    2.325  [80]    0.487  0.011 ** 
Attention to Details  2.109  [156]    2.167  [12]    -0.058  0.873  2.516  [64]    2.013  [80]    0.503  0.007 *** 
Enthusiasm 3.044  [158]    2.917  [12]    0.128  0.695  3.344  [64]    2.709  [79]    0.635  0.000 *** 
Persistence 3.480  [148]    3.545  [11]    -0.066  0.803  3.557  [61]    3.189  [74]    0.368  0.029 ** 
Proactive 3.406  [155]    3.250  [12]    0.156  0.601  3.475  [61]    3.175  [80]    0.300  0.075 * 
Work Ethics  3.535  [155]    3.333  [12]    0.202  0.429  3.708  [65]    3.538  [80]    0.170  0.162  
High Standards  2.891  [156]    2.583  [12]    0.308  0.382  3.250  [64]    2.924  [79]    0.326  0.057 * 
Listening Skills  2.500  [158]    2.250  [12]    0.250  0.496  2.719  [64]    2.494  [79]    0.225  0.269  
Open to Criticism  2.194  [155]    2.333  [12]    -0.140  0.693  2.774  [62]    2.077  [78]    0.697  0.001 *** 
Written Communication  2.713  [122]    2.125  [8]    0.588  0.215  2.911  [45]    2.507  [69]    0.404  0.057 * 
Oral Communication  2.854  [157]    2.750  [12]    0.104  0.749  3.328  [64]    2.910  [78]    0.418  0.010 *** 
Teamwork 2.682  [157]    2.583  [12]    0.098  0.789  3.079  [63]    2.481  [79]    0.598  0.002 *** 
Persuasion 2.968  [158]    3.000  [12]    -0.032  0.927  3.203  [64]    2.722  [79]    0.482  0.006 *** 
Accountable 2.377  [154]     2.167  [12]     0.210  0.570    2.922  [64]     2.628  [78]     0.294  0.117   
 Panel D: Comparison of Hired and Non-Hired candidates for companies assessing more than one candidate. 
   Hired     Non-Hired         
 Mean  Obs.     Mean  Obs.    
Diff. 
Means  P-value  
Hires A Players  2.310  [42]    2.204  [54]    0.106  0.650  
Develops People  2.524  [42]    2.222  [54]    0.302  0.201  
Removes Underperformers  2.214  [42]    1.907  [54]    0.307  0.214  
Respect 3.195  [41]    2.981  [53]    0.214  0.384  
Efficiency 3.381  [42]    2.796  [54]    0.585  0.007 *** 
Network 2.810  [42]    2.755  [53]    0.055  0.819  
Flexibility 3.024  [42]    2.547  [53]    0.477  0.043 ** 
Integrity 3.810  [42]    3.547  [53]    0.262  0.110  
Organization 2.929  [42]    2.667  [54]    0.262  0.283  
Calm 3.375  [40]    3.208  [53]    0.167  0.419  
Aggressive 3.585  [41]    3.019  [53]    0.566  0.004 *** 
Fast 3.381  [42]    2.865  [52]    0.516  0.019 ** 
Commitments 3.732  [41]    3.075  [53]    0.656  0.000 *** 
Brainpower 2.929  [42]    2.630  [54]    0.299  0.211  
Analysis 2.619  [42]    2.685  [54]    -0.066  0.799  
Strategic 2.561  [41]    2.333  [54]    0.228  0.359  
Creative 2.927  [41]    2.315  [54]    0.612  0.009 *** 
Attention to Details  2.548  [42]    1.963  [54]    0.585  0.010 *** 
Enthusiasm 3.390  [41]    2.679  [53]    0.711  0.001 *** 
Persistence 3.821  [39]    3.137  [51]    0.683  0.001 *** 
Proactive 3.488  [41]    3.167  [54]    0.321  0.126  
Work Ethics  3.833  [42]    3.481  [54]    0.352  0.025 ** 
High Standards  3.268  [41]    2.811  [53]    0.457  0.034 ** 
Listening Skills  2.268  [41]    2.491  [53]    -0.222  0.394  
Open to Criticism  2.659  [41]    2.115  [52]    0.543  0.033 ** 
Written Communication  2.688  [32]    2.295  [44]    0.392  0.174  
Oral Communication  3.244  [41]    3.019  [53]    0.225  0.294  
Teamwork 2.976  [42]    2.774  [53]    0.203  0.402  
Persuasion 3.415  [41]    2.736  [53]    0.679  0.002 *** 
Accountable 2.951  [41]     2.491  [53]     0.461  0.055 * TABLE 6:  This table presents marginal effects of probit estimates of hiring decisions for 316 CEO candidates assessed by ghSMART.  The endogenous 
variable is one if the candidate is hired and zero if not.  Independent variables include three main factors from factor analysis and two alternative factors from 
concentrated factor analysis described in table 4. P-values are reported in parentheses.  Statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, 
and *, respectively.  All standard errors are robust.  
 
   Full Sample     Only invested deals    
          Outsider    Buyout    VC    Outsider    Buyout    VC   
Incumbent  0.503 *** 0.487 ***        0.295 *** 0.444 ***        0.289 *** 0.426 *** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.001)  (0.000)      (0.001)  (0.000)  
Factor 1  0.099 ***     0.186 *** 0.149 *** 0.102 **          
  (0.000)      (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.015)           
Factor 2  0.004      0.004  0.014  -0.030           
  (0.864)      (0.941)  (0.739)  (0.430)           
Factor 3  -0.006      -0.106 * -0.090 * 0.036           
  (0.849)      (0.082)  (0.087)  (0.438)           
Alt. Factor 1   0.074 ***          0.166 *** 0.136 *** 0.078 * 
    (0.004)            (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.069)  
Alt. Factor 2   0.045            0.081  0.098 ** 0.011  
    (0.120)            (0.150)  (0.044)  (0.824)  
                        
Year Controls  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes  
                                                
Observations  316    316    116    114    120    116    114    120   
 TABLE 7 Characteristics and Invesment Decisions.  Mean ratings of invested and non-invested candidates for 316 CEO candidates assessed by ghSMART.  
 Panel A: Comparison of Candidates assessed for deals where Investor invests or not 
   Full Sample     Incumbents    
 Invest    Non-Invest      Invest    Non-Invest      
 Mean  Obs.     Mean  Obs.    
Diff. 
Means  P-value  Mean Obs.     Mean  Obs.    
Diff. 
Means  P-value  
Hires A Players  2.227  [233]    2.123  [81]    0.104  0.480  1.949  [117]    2.154  [52]    -0.205  0.288  
Develops People  2.321  [234]    2.037  [81]    0.283  0.053 * 2.102  [118]    2.058  [52]    0.044  0.816  
Removes Underperformers  1.948  [233]    1.815  [81]    0.134  0.360  1.829  [117]    1.846  [52]    -0.017  0.927  
Respect 2.939  [229]    2.827  [81]    0.112  0.484  2.949  [117]    2.885  [52]    0.064  0.759  
Efficiency 2.987  [230]    2.531  [81]    0.456  0.002 ***  2.846  [117]    2.500  [52]    0.346  0.093 * 
Network 2.671  [231]    2.469  [81]    0.202  0.192  2.573  [117]    2.327  [52]    0.246  0.237  
Flexibility 2.683  [230]    2.375  [80]    0.308  0.050 ** 2.647  [116]    2.231  [52]    0.416  0.040 ** 
Integrity 3.664  [229]    3.392  [79]    0.271  0.014 ** 3.652  [115]    3.440  [50]    0.212  0.150  
Organization 2.766  [231]    2.712  [80]    0.054  0.727  2.564  [117]    2.745  [51]    -0.181  0.383  
Calm 3.211  [228]    3.123  [81]    0.087  0.525  3.138  [116]    3.135  [52]    0.003  0.986  
Aggressive 3.150  [227]    3.099  [81]    0.051  0.705  3.200  [115]    3.269  [52]    -0.069  0.693  
Fast 3.052  [230]    2.937  [79]    0.115  0.428  3.103  [117]    2.961  [51]    0.142  0.454  
Commitments 3.416  [231]    3.123  [81]    0.292  0.019 ** 3.385  [117]    3.173  [52]    0.212  0.198  
Brainpower 2.870  [231]    2.852  [81]    0.018  0.898  3.026  [116]    2.731  [52]    0.295  0.112  
Analysis 2.621  [232]    2.456  [79]    0.165  0.307  2.556  [117]    2.250  [52]    0.306  0.138  
Strategic 2.558  [233]    2.575  [80]    -0.017  0.915  2.619  [118]    2.615  [52]    0.003  0.988  
Creative 2.681  [232]    2.642  [81]    0.039  0.792  2.795  [117]    2.750  [52]    0.045  0.812  
Attention to Details  2.220  [232]    2.025  [80]    0.195  0.196  2.137  [117]    2.059  [51]    0.078  0.699  
Enthusiasm 3.069  [232]    2.864  [81]    0.205  0.142  3.085  [118]    2.923  [52]    0.162  0.371  
Persistence 3.461  [217]    3.325  [77]    0.136  0.259  3.545  [110]    3.347  [49]    0.199  0.170  
Proactive 3.410  [229]    3.190  [79]    0.221  0.089 * 3.491  [116]    3.176  [51]    0.315  0.059 * 
Work Ethics  3.625  [232]    3.388  [80]    0.237  0.021 ** 3.612  [116]    3.314  [51]    0.298  0.036 ** 
High Standards  3.022  [231]    2.788  [80]    0.234  0.103  2.949  [117]    2.686  [51]    0.262  0.183  
Listening Skills  2.578  [232]    2.407  [81]    0.170  0.278  2.534  [118]    2.365  [52]    0.169  0.409  
Open to Criticism  2.314  [229]    2.205  [78]    0.109  0.485  2.214  [117]    2.180  [50]    0.034  0.866  
Written Communication  2.630  [181]    2.794  [63]    -0.164  0.356  2.615  [91]    2.821  [39]    -0.205  0.410  
Oral Communication  2.996  [230]    2.864  [81]    0.131  0.326  2.829  [117]    2.885  [52]    -0.056  0.757  
Teamwork 2.819  [232]    2.380  [79]    0.439  0.005 ***  2.780  [118]    2.431  [51]    0.348  0.089 * 
Persuasion 2.987  [232]    2.864  [81]    0.123  0.386  3.000  [118]    2.904  [52]    0.096  0.615  
Accountable 2.620  [229]     2.329  [79]     0.291  0.061 * 2.426  [115]     2.216  [51]     0.210  0.309   Panel B: Comparison of Investments and Non-Investments for Buyout and Venture Capital deals. 
   Buyouts     Venture Capital    
 Invest    Non-Invest      Invest    Non-Invest      
 Mean  Obs.     Mean  Obs.     Means  P-value  Mean  Obs.     Mean  Obs.     Means  P-value  
Hires A Players  2.159  [113]    2.088  [34]    0.071  0.745  2.292  [120]    2.149  [47]    0.143  0.478  
Develops People  2.316  [114]    2.059  [34]    0.257  0.261  2.325  [120]    2.021  [47]    0.304  0.114  
Removes Underperformers  2.009  [113]    1.676  [34]    0.332  0.132  1.892  [120]    1.915  [47]    -0.023  0.906  
Respect 3.062  [113]    3.147  [34]    -0.085  0.705  2.819  [116]    2.596  [47]    0.223  0.319  
Efficiency 2.938  [112]    2.382  [34]    0.555  0.011 ** 3.034  [118]    2.638  [47]    0.396  0.055 * 
Network 2.717  [113]    2.500  [34]    0.217  0.369  2.627  [118]    2.447  [47]    0.180  0.373  
Flexibility 2.850  [113]    2.394  [33]    0.456  0.055 * 2.521  [117]    2.362  [47]    0.160  0.447  
Integrity 3.741  [112]    3.333  [33]    0.408  0.008 ***  3.590  [117]    3.435  [46]    0.155  0.326  
Organization 2.723  [112]    2.912  [34]    -0.189  0.412  2.807  [119]    2.565  [46]    0.242  0.247  
Calm 3.081  [111]    3.176  [34]    -0.095  0.639  3.333  [117]    3.085  [47]    0.248  0.181  
Aggressive 3.143  [112]    3.029  [34]    0.113  0.579  3.157  [115]    3.149  [47]    0.008  0.966  
Fast 3.027  [112]    2.970  [33]    0.057  0.805  3.076  [118]    2.913  [46]    0.163  0.385  
Commitments 3.540  [113]    3.294  [34]    0.246  0.164  3.297  [118]    3.000  [47]    0.297  0.087 * 
Brainpower 2.743  [113]    2.794  [34]    -0.051  0.819  2.992  [118]    2.894  [47]    0.098  0.599  
Analysis 2.527  [112]    2.469  [32]    0.058  0.817  2.708  [120]    2.447  [47]    0.262  0.219  
Strategic 2.447  [114]    2.333  [33]    0.114  0.629  2.664  [119]    2.745  [47]    -0.081  0.709  
Creative 2.717  [113]    2.471  [34]    0.246  0.287  2.647  [119]    2.766  [47]    -0.119  0.537  
Attention to Details  2.460  [113]    2.294  [34]    0.166  0.483  1.992  [119]    1.826  [46]    0.166  0.378  
Enthusiasm 3.132  [114]    3.029  [34]    0.102  0.623  3.008  [118]    2.745  [47]    0.264  0.163  
Persistence 3.617  [107]    3.471  [34]    0.146  0.346  3.309  [110]    3.209  [43]    0.100  0.577  
Proactive 3.464  [112]    3.364  [33]    0.101  0.591  3.359  [117]    3.065  [46]    0.294  0.102  
Work Ethics  3.652  [112]    3.412  [34]    0.240  0.127  3.600  [120]    3.370  [46]    0.230  0.093 * 
High Standards  3.142  [113]    2.765  [34]    0.377  0.077 * 2.907  [118]    2.804  [46]    0.102  0.599  
Listening Skills  2.702  [114]    2.676  [34]    0.025  0.914  2.458  [118]    2.213  [47]    0.245  0.247  
Open to Criticism  2.500  [112]    2.333  [33]    0.167  0.477  2.137  [117]    2.111  [45]    0.026  0.902  
Written Communication  2.571  [98]    2.828  [29]    -0.256  0.295  2.699  [83]    2.765  [34]    -0.066  0.800  
Oral Communication  2.991  [113]    2.882  [34]    0.109  0.581  3.000  [117]    2.851  [47]    0.149  0.420  
Teamwork 2.904  [114]    2.469  [32]    0.435  0.062 * 2.737  [118]    2.319  [47]    0.418  0.048 ** 
Persuasion 3.018  [114]    2.971  [34]    0.047  0.826  2.958  [118]    2.787  [47]    0.170  0.375  
Accountable 2.741  [112]     2.333  [33]     0.408  0.083 * 2.504  [117]     2.326  [46]     0.178  0.390   
 TABLE 8: Marginal effects of probit estimates for investment decisions for 316 CEO candidates assessed by ghSMART.  The endogenous variable is whether 
the private equity firm invested or not. Independent variables include three main factors from factor analysis and two alternative factors from concentrated factor 
analysis described in table 4. P-values are reported in parentheses.  Statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 




sample   Buyout  
Venture 
Capital   
Full 
sample   Buyout  
Venture 
Capital   
Incumbent  -0.095 * 0.013    -0.200 ***  -0.095 * 0.001    -0.203 *** 
  (0.065)  (0.867)  (0.008)  (0.060)  (0.990)  (0.006)  
Factor 1  0.058 ** 0.063  0.081 **          
  (0.026)  (0.106)  (0.030)           
Factor 2  0.015  0.010  0.017           
  (0.567)  (0.799)  (0.660)           
Factor 3  -0.024  0.002  -0.035           
  (0.394)  (0.960)  (0.404)           
Alt. Factor 1         0.043  0.042  0.067 * 
          (0.106)  (0.248)  (0.100)  
Alt. Factor 2         0.048 * 0.042  0.062  
          (0.090)  (0.325)  (0.129)  
                  
Year Controls  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
                                    
Observations  316    148    160    316    148    160   
 TABLE 9 Comparison of successful and non-successful CEOs hired from 316 CEO candidates assessed by ghSMART.  PE success measure is based on 
responses from PE firms.  Public success measure supplements PE measure with public information on CEO and company outcomes.  Broad public success 
measure supplements public measure with public information on CEO and company progress. 
Panel A: Comparison of successful and non-successful candidates for Public and PE success measures 
   PE Success Measure     Public Success Measure    
  Success   Non-Success        Success   Non-Success       
  Mean  Obs.     Mean  Obs.    
Diff. 
Means  P-val    Mean Obs.      Mean Obs.     
Diff. 
Means  P-val  
Hires A Players  2.514  [37]    2.033  [30]    0.480 0.135    2.333  [54]  2.104  [67]  0.229 0.311   
Develops People  2.351  [37]    2.633  [30]    -0.282 0.357    2.389  [54]  2.313  [67]  0.075 0.727   
Rem Underperformers  2.324  [37]    1.833  [30]    0.491 0.116    2.185  [54]  1.985  [67]  0.200 0.372   
Respect  2.972  [36]  3.367  [30]  -0.394 0.153    3.038 [53]    3.179 [67]    -0.141  0.518   
Efficiency 3.054  [37]    3.067  [30]    -0.013  0.965    3.074 [54]    2.925 [67]    0.149  0.490   
Network  2.703  [37]  2.567  [30]  0.136 0.679    2.722 [54]    2.597 [67]    0.125  0.592   
Flexibility 2.432  [37]    2.931  [29]    -0.499  0.121    2.593 [54]    2.742 [66]    -0.150  0.502   
Integrity 3.865  [37]    3.867  [30]    -0.002  0.983    3.778 [54]    3.682 [66]    0.096  0.456   
Organization 2.892  [37]    2.833  [30]    0.059  0.836    2.889 [54]    2.642 [67]    0.247  0.256   
Calm  3.139  [36]  3.267  [30]  -0.128 0.650    3.113 [53]    3.209 [67]    -0.096  0.654   
Aggressive 3.389  [36]    3.167  [30]    0.222  0.360    3.377 [53]    3.239 [67]    0.139  0.446   
Fast  3.278  [36]  3.033  [30]  0.244 0.355    3.358 [53]    3.106 [66]    0.252  0.214   
Commitments 3.500  [36]    3.467  [30]    0.033  0.884    3.585 [53]    3.493 [67]    0.092  0.547   
Brainpower  3.108  [37]  2.931  [29]  0.177 0.502    3.241 [54]    2.924 [66]    0.316  0.111   
Analysis  2.703  [37]  2.600  [30]  0.103 0.746    2.741 [54]    2.552 [67]    0.189  0.420   
Strategic 2.694  [36]    2.700  [30]    -0.006  0.986    2.755 [53]    2.612 [67]    0.143  0.535   
Creative  2.917  [36]  2.833  [30]  0.083 0.753    3.000 [53]    2.716 [67]    0.284  0.165   
Attention to Details  2.324  [37]    2.233  [30]    0.091 0.763    2.241  [54]  2.167  [66]  0.074 0.732   
Enthusiasm 3.111  [36]    3.267  [30]    -0.156  0.523    3.189 [53]    3.209 [67]    -0.020  0.913   
Persistence 3.697  [33]    3.500  [30]    0.197  0.303    3.760 [50]    3.530 [66]    0.230  0.093  * 
Proactive  3.750  [36]  3.367  [30]  0.383 0.053  * 3.736 [53]    3.364 [66]    0.372  0.015  ** 
Work Ethics  3.757  [37]    3.567  [30]    0.190  0.227    3.759 [54]    3.652 [66]    0.108  0.363   
High Standards  3.222  [36]    2.867  [30]    0.356  0.213    3.208 [53]    2.985 [66]    0.223  0.285   
Listening Skills  2.500  [36]    2.767  [30]    -0.267 0.397    2.491  [53]  2.552  [67]  -0.062 0.786   
Open to Criticism  2.472  [36]    2.500  [30]    -0.028 0.930    2.434  [53]  2.303  [66]  0.131 0.571   
Written Comm.  3.040  [25]    2.929  [28]    0.111  0.729    3.000 [40]    2.625 [56]    0.375  0.148   
Oral Communication  2.972  [36]    3.300  [30]    -0.328 0.194    2.849  [53]  3.045  [67]  -0.196 0.304   
Teamwork  2.649  [37]  3.333  [30]  -0.685 0.016  ** 2.741  [54]  2.955  [67]  -0.214 0.330   
Persuasion 3.000  [36]    3.133  [30]    -0.133  0.634    3.151 [53]    3.075 [67]    0.076  0.693   
Accountable 2.694  [36]      2.667 [30]      0.028 0.930      2.635  [52]     2.591 [66]      0.044 0.851     Panel B: Comparison of successful and non-successful candidates for Buyout and VC deals using PE success measure. 
   Buyout     Venture Capital    
 Success    Non-Success      Success    Non-Success      
 Mean  Obs.     Mean  Obs.     Means  P-value  Mean  Obs.     Mean  Obs.     Means  P-value  
Hires A Players  2.667  [21]    1.875  [8]    0.792  0.145  2.312  [16]    2.091  [22]    0.222  0.614  
Develops People  2.571  [21]    2.375  [8]    0.196  0.711  2.062  [16]    2.727  [22]    -0.665  0.105  
Removes Underperformers  2.381  [21]    1.875  [8]    0.506  0.358  2.250  [16]    1.818  [22]    0.432  0.300  
Respect 3.190  [21]    3.250  [8]    -0.060  0.894  2.667  [15]    3.409  [22]    -0.742  0.058 * 
Efficiency 3.476  [21]    2.500  [8]    0.976  0.017 ** 2.500  [16]    3.273  [22]    -0.773  0.064 * 
Network 2.952  [21]    2.125  [8]    0.827  0.146  2.375  [16]    2.727  [22]    -0.352  0.420  
Flexibility 2.905  [21]    3.250  [8]    -0.345  0.497  1.812  [16]    2.810  [21]    -0.997  0.021 ** 
Integrity 3.905  [21]    3.875  [8]    0.030  0.822  3.812  [16]    3.864  [22]    -0.051  0.680  
Organization 3.143  [21]    2.125  [8]    1.018  0.042 ** 2.562  [16]    3.091  [22]    -0.528  0.144  
Calm 3.333  [21]    2.750  [8]    0.583  0.209  2.867  [15]    3.455  [22]    -0.588  0.131  
Aggressive 3.571  [21]    3.000  [8]    0.571  0.132  3.133  [15]    3.227  [22]    -0.094  0.788  
Fast 3.500  [20]    3.000  [8]    0.500  0.215  3.000  [16]    3.045  [22]    -0.045  0.904  
Commitments 3.905  [21]    3.375  [8]    0.530  0.024 ** 2.933  [15]    3.500  [22]    -0.567  0.115  
Brainpower 3.190  [21]    2.500  [8]    0.690  0.122  3.000  [16]    3.095  [21]    -0.095  0.789  
Analysis 2.905  [21]    1.750  [8]    1.155  0.033 ** 2.438  [16]    2.909  [22]    -0.472  0.256  
Strategic 2.857  [21]    2.625  [8]    0.232  0.652  2.467  [15]    2.727  [22]    -0.261  0.543  
Creative 3.048  [21]    3.125  [8]    -0.077  0.876  2.733  [15]    2.727  [22]    0.006  0.985  
Attention to Details  2.810  [21]    1.500  [8]    1.310  0.008 ***  1.688  [16]    2.500  [22]    -0.812  0.037 ** 
Enthusiasm 3.333  [21]    3.625  [8]    -0.292  0.404  2.800  [15]    3.136  [22]    -0.336  0.348  
Persistence 4.000  [21]    3.500  [8]    0.500  0.004 ***  3.167  [12]    3.500  [22]    -0.333  0.303  
Proactive 4.000  [21]    3.625  [8]    0.375  0.024 ** 3.400  [15]    3.273  [22]    0.127  0.693  
Work Ethics  3.905  [21]    3.625  [8]    0.280  0.271  3.562  [16]    3.545  [22]    0.017  0.937  
High Standards  3.667  [21]    2.875  [8]    0.792  0.018 ** 2.600  [15]    2.864  [22]    -0.264  0.545  
Listening Skills  2.810  [21]    2.750  [8]    0.060  0.908  2.067  [15]    2.773  [22]    -0.706  0.107  
Open to Criticism  2.857  [21]    2.375  [8]    0.482  0.363  1.933  [15]    2.545  [22]    -0.612  0.144  
Written Communication  2.889  [18]    2.250  [8]    0.639  0.186  3.429  [7]    3.200  [20]    0.229  0.654  
Oral Communication  2.905  [21]    3.250  [8]    -0.345  0.432  3.067  [15]    3.318  [22]    -0.252  0.462  
Teamwork 3.190  [21]    3.500  [8]    -0.310  0.429  1.938  [16]    3.273  [22]    -1.335  0.001 *** 
Persuasion 3.238  [21]    3.125  [8]    0.113  0.800  2.667  [15]    3.136  [22]    -0.470  0.239  
Accountable 3.000  [21]    2.000  [8]    1.000  0.036 ** 2.267  [15]    2.909  [22]    -0.642  0.161   
 Panel C: Comparison of successful and non-successful candidates for Buyout and VC deals using public success measure 
   Buyout     Venture Capital    
 Success    Non-Success      Success    Non-Success      
 Mean  Obs.     Mean  Obs.     Means  P-value  Mean  Obs.     Mean  Obs.     Means  P-value  
Hires A Players  2.419  [31]    1.833  [24]    0.586  0.072 * 2.217  [23]    2.256  [43]    -0.038  0.908  
Develops People  2.645  [31]    2.125  [24]    0.520  0.106  2.043  [23]    2.419  [43]    -0.375  0.219  
Removes Underperformers  2.290  [31]    1.958  [24]    0.332  0.310  2.043  [23]    2.000  [43]    0.043  0.894  
Respect 3.258  [31]    3.375  [24]    -0.117  0.691  2.727  [22]    3.070  [43]    -0.342  0.302  
Efficiency 3.484  [31]    2.458  [24]    1.026  0.000 ***  2.522  [23]    3.186  [43]    -0.664  0.042 ** 
Network 3.000  [31]    2.458  [24]    0.542  0.115  2.348  [23]    2.674  [43]    -0.327  0.327  
Flexibility 2.968  [31]    3.167  [24]    -0.199  0.503  2.087  [23]    2.500  [42]    -0.413  0.198  
Integrity 3.839  [31]    3.542  [24]    0.297  0.140  3.696  [23]    3.762  [42]    -0.066  0.705  
Organization 3.000  [31]    2.042  [24]    0.958  0.003 ***  2.739  [23]    2.977  [43]    -0.238  0.423  
Calm 3.226  [31]    3.000  [24]    0.226  0.465  2.955  [22]    3.326  [43]    -0.371  0.237  
Aggressive 3.484  [31]    3.083  [24]    0.401  0.134  3.227  [22]    3.326  [43]    -0.098  0.710  
Fast 3.433  [30]    3.125  [24]    0.308  0.299  3.261  [23]    3.095  [42]    0.166  0.573  
Commitments 3.935  [31]    3.333  [24]    0.602  0.001 ***  3.091  [22]    3.581  [43]    -0.490  0.040 ** 
Brainpower 3.194  [31]    2.667  [24]    0.527  0.084 * 3.304  [23]    3.071  [42]    0.233  0.396  
Analysis 2.806  [31]    2.208  [24]    0.598  0.088 * 2.652  [23]    2.744  [43]    -0.092  0.780  
Strategic 2.806  [31]    2.375  [24]    0.431  0.180  2.682  [22]    2.744  [43]    -0.062  0.857  
Creative 3.097  [31]    2.792  [24]    0.305  0.329  2.864  [22]    2.674  [43]    0.189  0.508  
Attention to Details  2.548  [31]    2.042  [24]    0.507  0.122  1.826  [23]    2.238  [42]    -0.412  0.166  
Enthusiasm 3.323  [31]    3.417  [24]    -0.094  0.701  3.000  [22]    3.093  [43]    -0.093  0.744  
Persistence 3.935  [31]    3.609  [23]    0.327  0.007 ***  3.474  [19]    3.488  [43]    -0.015  0.952  
Proactive 3.839  [31]    3.375  [24]    0.464  0.010 ***  3.591  [22]    3.357  [42]    0.234  0.349  
Work Ethics  3.839  [31]    3.625  [24]    0.214  0.265  3.652  [23]    3.667  [42]    -0.014  0.926  
High Standards  3.516  [31]    2.833  [24]    0.683  0.017 ** 2.773  [22]    3.071  [42]    -0.299  0.335  
Listening Skills  2.774  [31]    2.500  [24]    0.274  0.408  2.091  [22]    2.581  [43]    -0.490  0.135  
Open to Criticism  2.839  [31]    2.333  [24]    0.505  0.140  1.864  [22]    2.286  [42]    -0.422  0.186  
Written Communication  2.923  [26]    2.238  [21]    0.685  0.045 ** 3.143  [14]    2.857  [35]    0.286  0.497  
Oral Communication  2.871  [31]    2.833  [24]    0.038  0.892  2.818  [22]    3.163  [43]    -0.345  0.214  
Teamwork 3.194  [31]    3.000  [24]    0.194  0.535  2.130  [23]    2.930  [43]    -0.800  0.010 *** 
Persuasion 3.355  [31]    3.000  [24]    0.355  0.189  2.864  [22]    3.116  [43]    -0.253  0.380  
Accountable 2.933  [30]    2.167  [24]    0.767  0.020 ** 2.227  [22]    2.833  [42]    -0.606  0.071 * 
 Panel D: Comparison of successful and non-successful candidates for VC and Buyout deals using broad success measure 
   Buyout     Venture Capital    
 Success    Non-Success      Success    Non-Success      
 Mean  Obs.     Mean  Obs.     Means  P-value  Mean  Obs.     Mean  Obs.     Means  P-value  
Hires A Players  2.349  [43]    1.967  [30]    0.382  0.173  2.327  [49]    2.278  [54]    0.049  0.838  
Develops People  2.442  [43]    2.267  [30]    0.175  0.534  2.122  [49]    2.463  [54]    -0.341  0.114  
Removes Underperformers  2.233  [43]    1.867  [30]    0.366  0.193  1.980  [49]    1.981  [54]    -0.002  0.993  
Respect 3.047  [43]    3.333  [30]    -0.287  0.295  2.609  [46]    2.963  [54]    -0.354  0.166  
Efficiency 3.190  [42]    2.500  [30]    0.690  0.009 ***  2.809  [47]    3.204  [54]    -0.395  0.094 * 
Network 2.884  [43]    2.700  [30]    0.184  0.545  2.583  [48]    2.648  [54]    -0.065  0.793  
Flexibility 2.791  [43]    3.233  [30]    -0.443  0.104  2.396  [48]    2.642  [53]    -0.246  0.315  
Integrity 3.744  [43]    3.633  [30]    0.111  0.542  3.551  [49]    3.774  [53]    -0.223  0.141  
Organization 2.977  [43]    2.207  [29]    0.770  0.009 ***  2.604  [48]    2.963  [54]    -0.359  0.121  
Calm 3.186  [43]    3.033  [30]    0.153  0.551  3.255  [47]    3.389  [54]    -0.134  0.526  
Aggressive 3.349  [43]    3.100  [30]    0.249  0.283  3.244  [45]    3.315  [54]    -0.070  0.727  
Fast 3.238  [42]    3.067  [30]    0.171  0.523  3.184  [49]    3.019  [53]    0.165  0.458  
Commitments 3.814  [43]    3.433  [30]    0.381  0.023 ** 3.104  [48]    3.556  [54]    -0.451  0.017 ** 
Brainpower 2.907  [43]    2.667  [30]    0.240  0.373  3.208  [48]    2.981  [53]    0.227  0.284  
Analysis 2.581  [43]    2.233  [30]    0.348  0.252  2.694  [49]    2.741  [54]    -0.047  0.843  
Strategic 2.558  [43]    2.300  [30]    0.258  0.356  2.792  [48]    2.778  [54]    0.014  0.957  
Creative 2.884  [43]    2.667  [30]    0.217  0.423  2.917  [48]    2.685  [54]    0.231  0.284  
Attention to Details  2.674  [43]    2.200  [30]    0.474  0.098 * 1.812  [48]    2.132  [53]    -0.320  0.157  
Enthusiasm 3.302  [43]    3.533  [30]    -0.231  0.263  2.896  [48]    3.093  [54]    -0.197  0.357  
Persistence 3.900  [40]    3.586  [29]    0.314  0.008 ***  3.341  [41]    3.426  [54]    -0.084  0.670  
Proactive 3.721  [43]    3.467  [30]    0.254  0.105  3.340  [47]    3.358  [53]    -0.018  0.929  
Work Ethics  3.860  [43]    3.567  [30]    0.294  0.064 * 3.429  [49]    3.642  [53]    -0.213  0.148  
High Standards  3.419  [43]    2.933  [30]    0.485  0.050 ** 2.812  [48]    3.000  [53]    -0.188  0.423  
Listening Skills  2.721  [43]    2.700  [30]    0.021  0.944  2.208  [48]    2.667  [54]    -0.458  0.060 * 
Open to Criticism  2.767  [43]    2.467  [30]    0.301  0.320  2.087  [46]    2.302  [53]    -0.215  0.368  
Written Communication  2.833  [36]    2.296  [27]    0.537  0.071 * 2.933  [30]    3.000  [40]    -0.067  0.827  
Oral Communication  2.907  [43]    3.033  [30]    -0.126  0.611  2.833  [48]    3.222  [54]    -0.389  0.057 * 
Teamwork 3.116  [43]    2.933  [30]    0.183  0.507  2.417  [48]    2.944  [54]    -0.528  0.024 ** 
Persuasion 3.233  [43]    3.033  [30]    0.199  0.423  2.896  [48]    3.074  [54]    -0.178  0.414  
Accountable 2.929  [42]    2.233  [30]    0.695  0.014 ** 2.271  [48]    2.712  [52]    -0.441  0.076 * TABLE 10 Coefficients from OLS regressions for success of 316 CEO candidates assessed by ghSMART.   The endogenous variable is the outcome of the deal.  
PE success measure is based on responses from PE firms.  Public success measure supplements PE measure with public information on CEO and company 
outcomes.  Broad public success measure supplements public measure with public information on CEO and company progress.  Independent variables include 
three main factors from factor analysis and two alternative factors from concentrated factor analysis described in table 4.  P-values are reported in parentheses, 
and statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. All standard errors are robust. 
 
Panel A All hired candidates with success outcomes 
   (1)    (2)      (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 
 
PE 
Measure   
Public 
Measure   
Broad 
Measure   
PE 
Measure   
Public 
Measure   
Broad 
Measure 
Incumbent  -0.009    0.120    0.088    -0.041    0.081    0.087 
  (0.927)  (0.203)  (0.176)  (0.712)  (0.398)  (0.175) 
Factor 1  0.100 * 0.106 **  0.042            
  (0.094)  (0.030)  (0.189)          
Factor 2  -0.200 *** -0.101 **  -0.067 **           
  (0.000)  (0.025)  (0.042)          
Factor 3  0.050  0.036  0.026            
  (0.376)  (0.462)  (0.461)          
           0.189 ***  0.147 ***  0.079  Alt. Factor 
1          (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.026) 
           -0.127 **  -0.030  -0.028  Alt. Factor 
2          (0.019)  (0.511)  (0.385) 
Constant  0.182  0.162  0.420 **  0.217 * 0.237  0.428 
  (0.124)    (0.539)    (0.014)    (0.069)    (0.302)    (0.008) 
Obs.  81  126  208  81  126  208 
R-squared  0.339    0.165    0.080    0.301    0.155    0.074 
 
 Panel B: Factors and success measures by PE firm type 
   (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)     (7)     (8)     (9)     (10)     (11)     (12)    
  Buyout    Buyout    Buyout    Buyout    Buyout    Buyout   VC  VC  VC  VC  VC  VC  
 
PE 
Measure   
Public 
Measure   
Broad 
Measure   
PE 
Measure   
Public 
Measure   
Broad 
Measure   
PE 
Measure   
Public 
Measure   
Broad 
Measure   
PE 
Measure   
Public 
Measure   
Broad 
Measure   
Incumbent  0.125    0.173    0.088    -0.094    -0.009    0.036    0.088    0.217    0.141    0.088    0.216 * 0.148 * 
 (0.407)  (0.176)  (0.353)  (0.550)  (0.941)  (0.703)  (0.573)  (0.103)  (0.116)  (0.571)  (0.099)  (0.091)  
Factor 1  0.280 ** 0.309 ***  0.146 ***            0.056  0.014  -0.021              
 (0.050)  (0.001)  (0.005)            (0.499)  (0.861)  (0.611)           
Factor 2  -0.212 * -0.064  -0.051              -0.156 ** -0.100 * -0.067              
 (0.062)  (0.405)  (0.340)            (0.012)  (0.086)  (0.115)           
Factor 3  0.125  0.079  0.069              0.005  0.008  0.007              
 (0.131)  (0.266)  (0.210)            (0.958)  (0.915)  (0.892)           
           0.352 ***  0.272 ***  0.155 **             0.112  0.056  0.023   Alt. 
Factor 1          (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.011)            (0.184)  (0.486)  (0.618)  
           -0.132  0.071  0.034              -0.117  -0.094 * -0.071 *  Alt. 
Factor 2          (0.276)  (0.378)  (0.533)            (0.118)  (0.088)  (0.086)  
Constant  0.261 * -0.060  0.372 ** 0.410  -0.206 ***  0.389 ** 0.144  0.083  0.362 * 0.159  0.106  0.359 * 
 (0.100)  (0.534)  (0.011)  (0.297)  (0.009)  (0.029)  (0.318)  (0.740)  (0.055)  (0.275)  (0.650)  (0.052)  
                                    
Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Year 
Controls                                                                        
Obs.  32  57  88  32  57  88  49  69  120  49  69  120  
R-squared  0.480    0.346    0.177    0.350    0.297    0.142    0.303    0.138    0.091    0.289    0.143    0.091   
 Panel C: OLS Regressions with factors and success measures by incumbency 
   (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)     (7)     (8)     (9)     (10)     (11)     (12)    















Measure   
Public 
Measure   
Broad 
Measure   
PE 
Measure   
Public 
Measure   
Broad 
Measure   
Factor 1  0.071    0.077    0.022    -0.094    -0.009    0.036    0.228 * 0.292 **  0.123    0.088    0.216 * 0.148 * 
 (0.285)  (0.163)  (0.551)  (0.550)  (0.941)  (0.703)  (0.093)  (0.024)  (0.138)  (0.571)  (0.099)  (0.091)  
Factor 2  -0.182 ***  -0.119 **  -0.069 *           -0.480 ***  -0.032  -0.074           
 (0.004)  (0.019)  (0.085)            (0.002)  (0.788)  (0.260)           
Factor 3  0.056  0.043  0.029            0.034  -0.069  0.008           
 (0.361)  (0.426)  (0.484)            (0.802)  (0.570)  (0.923)           
0.125  0.079  0.069  0.154 **  0.126 **  0.060  0.005  0.008  0.007  0.452 ***  0.234 **  0.153 *  Alt. 
Factor 1  (0.131)  (0.266)  (0.210)  (0.030)  (0.038)  (0.139)  (0.958)  (0.915)  (0.892)  (0.004)  (0.023)  (0.057)  
         -0.142 **  -0.066  -0.039            -0.300 ** 0.092  -0.002   Alt. 
Factor 2          (0.036)  (0.209)  (0.314)            (0.039)  (0.438)  (0.971)  
Const.  0.192  0.271  0.383 **  0.180 * 0.310  0.402 **  1.272 ***  -0.141  0.667 ***  1.213 ***  -0.104  0.671 *** 
  (0.108)  (0.229)  (0.026)  (0.084)  (0.105)  (0.015)  (0.000)  (0.337)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.257)  (0.000)  
                                         
Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Year 
Controls                                                                        
Obs.  56  89  144  56  89  144  25  37  64  25  37  64  
R-squared  0.317    0.185    0.084    0.294    0.169    0.076    0.636    0.304    0.124    0.517    0.297    0.123   
 